Demographic Profile of the Arab Region: Realizing the Demographic Dividend. E/ESCWA/SDD/2016/Technical Paper 3 by Loichinger, E. et al.
 Distr. 
LIMITED 
E/ESCWA/SDD/2016/Technical Paper.3 
26 September 2016 
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 
 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Profile of the Arab Region 
Realizing the Demographic Dividend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations 
Beirut, 2016 
 
16-00248
iii 
CONTENTS 
Page 
 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ v 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
  A. Population size and growth rates ........................................................................................ 1 
  B. Fertility levels and trends .................................................................................................... 5 
  C. Mortality levels and trends .................................................................................................. 8 
  D. Population distribution ........................................................................................................ 12 
  E. Age structure ....................................................................................................................... 17 
  F. Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................ 19 
  A. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 20 
  B. Demographic dividend: concept and calculations .............................................................. 20 
  C. Demographic dividend in Arab countries ........................................................................... 24 
  A. Case studies from non-Arab countries ................................................................................ 30 
  B. Lessons learned ................................................................................................................... 33 
  C. Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 34 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 61 
Table 1. Estimated number of international migrants in Arab countries, 2000, 2010 and 2013....... 15 
Table 2. Age-specific weights of labour income and consumption, high-income and  
    non-high-income countries ................................................................................................. 24 
Table 3. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity by subregion ................................ 25 
Table 4. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Maghreb countries ................... 28 
Table 5. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Mashreq countries ................... 28 
Table 6. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Arab LDCs .............................. 28 
 
  
iv 
CONTENTS (continued) 
 
Page 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Total population and average annual rate of population growth, Arab subregions, 
   1980-2050 ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Figure 2. Average annual population growth rates of Arab countries, 1980-2015 and 2015-2050 . 3 
Figure 3. Total population of Arab countries, 1980-2050: 2012 estimations and 2015 projections, 
   medium, low, and high fertility variants .......................................................................... 4 
Figure 4. Relative share of population by subregion, 1980-2050 .................................................... 4 
Figure 5. Sex ratio, Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 .......................................................... 5 
Figure 6. Total fertility rates in the Arab region: minimum, maximum and 20 to 80 per cent range,  
   1980-1985, 2010-2015 and 2045-2050 ............................................................................ 6 
Figure 7. Total fertility rates in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 .................................. 6 
Figure 8. Age-specific fertility rates by subregion, 1980-1985, 2010-2015, 2045-2050 ................. 7 
Figure 9. Life expectancy at birth by sex and subregion, 1980-2050 .............................................. 8 
Figure 10. Gender gap in life expectancy at birth in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 ... 9 
Figure 11. Infant mortality by country, 1980-2050 ........................................................................... 10 
Figure 12. Urban population in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 ................................... 12 
Figure 13. Population of urban agglomerations with 300,000 inhabitants or more in 2014, Arab 
   subregions, 1980-2030 ..................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 14. Net number of migrants in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 ......................... 16 
Figure 15. Net migration rate in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 .................................. 16 
Figure 16. Dependency ratio in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 ................................... 18 
Figure 17. Age dependency ratio (A) and share of the working-age population (B) in Arab subregions, 
   1980-2050 ......................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 18. Normalized per capita consumption and labour income by age group, high-income and 
   non-high-income countries ............................................................................................... 23 
Figure 19. Maghreb: support ratio and its annual growth rate, 1980-2050 ....................................... 25 
Figure 20. Mashreq: support ratio and its annual growth rate, 1980-2050 ........................................ 25 
Figure 21. Arab LDCs: support ratio and its annual growth rate, 1980-2050 ................................... 25 
Figure 22. Support ratio in countries  of the Maghreb, 1980-2050 ................................................... 26 
Figure 23. Support ratio in countries of the Mashreq, 1980-2050 ..................................................... 26 
Figure 24. Support ratio in Arab LDCs, 1980-2050 .......................................................................... 26 
Figure 25. Growth rate of the support ratio in Arab countries, 1980-2050 ....................................... 27 
Figure 26. Demographic window of opportunity time span in Maghreb, Mashreq and Arab least 
   developed countries between 1980 and 2050 ................................................................... 29 
v 
Acknowledgements 
This study was written by Elke Loichinger, Lecturer at Chulalongkorn University; Anne Goujon, Leader 
of the Human Capital DataLab at the Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences 
and Research Scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and Daniela Weber, 
Research Scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. The process was lead by 
Karima El Korri, Chief of the Population and Social Development Section at the Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), and coordinated by Jozef Bartovic, Associate Social Affairs 
Officer. 
The team would like to thank the following ESCWA colleagues, who have reviewed various parts of 
the report: Marwan Khawaja, Chief of the Demographic and Social Statistics Section; Romesh Silva, 
Demographer and Statistician, Naeem Al-Mutawakel, Social Affairs Officer; Rouba Arja, First 
Population Affairs Officer at ESCWA and Lara El Khoury, Research Assistant. 
Introduction 
The demographic transition is a change in patterns of population growth, from high rates of fertility and 
mortality to low rates of fertility and mortality. At an early stage, this transition leads to a shift in the 
population’s age composition whereby the number of working-age persons exceeds that of economically 
dependent persons. More resources are then available for investment in human capital (health and education), 
physical capital, and economic and social development. This phase is referred to as the demographic dividend 
or demographic window of opportunity. Its duration varies between countries, and it is affected by various 
factors such as the speed of fertility decline (the faster the better), and employment and productivity rates.  
Today, Arab countries are registering declining fertility rates and increases in life expectancy, although at 
different paces and starting from different levels. They are thus at different stages of the demographic transition 
and of the window of opportunity.  
This study, aimed at analysing the demographic changes that Arab countries are undergoing, classes them in 
four categories: (a) Arab least developed countries (LDCs): Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan 
and Yemen; (b) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates; (c) Mashreq countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, State of Palestine and Syrian Arab 
Republic; and (d) Maghreb countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. It gives an overview of population 
dynamics and trends in the Arab region and assesses the window of opportunity during which each country 
could reap the benefits of its changing population structure.  
Reaping the benefits of the demographic dividend is not automatic and requires an enabling policy 
environment. The study thus presents four case studies on countries that benefitted from their demographic 
window of opportunity by implementing sound policies, making recommendations for the Arab region.  
 POPULATION DYNAMICS IN THE ARAB REGION 
The population of the Arab region has been growing over the past decades, due to the combined effect of 
rapidly declining mortality rates and less rapidly declining fertility rates. This trend is likely to continue in the 
near future, though at a slower pace, influencing the age composition of the population, which will remain 
relatively youthful. This will translate in a bulge in the population of working age, a key parameter for the 
socioeconomic future of the region. 
A. Population size and growth rates 
In 2015, the population of the Arab region was estimated at about 390 million, growing from 166 million in 
1980.1 It is expected to reach 660 million in 2050 in the medium fertility variant scenario (annex table 1A). 
Population growth has slowed down. While the number of people had doubled between 1980 and 1998, the 
2015 population is not expected to double in the coming 35 years (until 2050) under the medium fertility 
variant (figure 1). Under the high fertility variant, the population in the Arab region would reach 732 million 
in 2050, i.e. 11 per cent more than under the medium variant; it would reach 591 million under the low fertility 
variant, i.e. 10 per cent less than under the medium variant (annex table 2A).  
The four Arab subregions have different rates of population growth. Arab LDCs had 31 million inhabitants in 
1980 and 84 million in 2015. Projections show that the population will almost double in the next 35 years to 
reach 165 million. The number of inhabitants has more than tripled in  GCC countries between 1980 and 2015, 
increasing from 14 to 53 million. In 2050, it is expected to reach 76 million under the medium fertility variant. 
The Mashreq subregion is the most populated: the number of inhabitants has more than doubled, from 72 
                                                                
1
 Unless otherwise indicated, population data are taken from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
2015. Low and high fertility variants only differ from the medium variant with respect to underlying country specific fertility 
assumptions. 
2 
million in 1980 to 165 million in 2050, and it is expected to reach 300 million in 2050. The population in the 
Maghreb subregion has been growing at a slower pace, from 49 million in 1980 to 92 million in 2015 and 122 
million in 2050 under the medium fertility variant.  
Figure 1. Total population and average annual rate of population growth, Arab subregions, 1980-2050 
(medium fertility variant) 
B.  Population growth rate A.  Population size 
  
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 
2015, DVD Edition). 
The absolute numbers of inhabitants in the four subregions show linear increasing trends from 1980 to 2050, 
unlike growth rates, which have been declining quite rapidly. On average, the Arab region was growing at a 
rate of 3 per cent annually in the early 1980s, a figure that has decreased to 2 per cent in 2015. Under the 
medium fertility variant, the average annual growth rate of the Arab region will reach 1 per cent by 2050.  
Between 2002 and 2007, the average regional population growth rate increased, most likely owing to return 
migration from the United States of America and European countries after the World Trade Center attack on 
11 September 2001.2 There was an increase in the population of the Mashreq and Maghreb subregions because 
of lower GCC demand for Arab workers, who were replaced by more wage-competitive Asian workers.3 GCC 
countries seem to have experienced two main waves of population growth due to incoming migrant workers: 
one in the early 1980s, during which the annual population growth rate exceeded 6 per cent, and one around 
2005, during which it exceeded 5 per cent. Arab LDCs had a peak in population growth in the early 1990s, 
mostly due to the crisis in Ethiopia and Somalia and incoming flows of refugees to the Sudan and Yemen.  
A comparison of population growth rates between the past and the coming 35 years (1980-2015 and  
2015-2050) reveals interesting population dynamics in individual countries (figure 2). The populations of 
                                                                
2 ESCWA, 2013. 
3 International Organization for Migration and the League of Arab States, 2004. 
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Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which grew at an average annual rate that exceeded 6 per cent from 1980 
to 2015, should expand at much lower rates in the future, averaging to less than 1 per cent annually during the 
period 2015-2050. This change is due to further declines in fertility rates, owing to larger expatriate 
populations, higher averages of marriage age and increased educational attainment among women.4  The 
countries that are likely to grow most at a relatively fast pace, with a rate exceeding 2 per cent, are Somalia, 
Iraq and the State of Palestine. The countries that may witness average annual growth rates below or close to 
1 per cent between 2015 and 2050 are Djibouti, all GCC countries and Maghreb countries, and Lebanon among 
Mashreq countries. Lebanon would actually be the only Arab country experiencing negative population growth 
in the coming 35 years.  
Figure 2. Average annual population growth rates of Arab countries, 1980-2015 and 2015-2050  
(medium fertility variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
Comparing the 2012 and 2015 rounds of estimations and projections by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs reveals that population figures are noticeably higher in the latter (figure 3). The 
difference stems mostly from the Mashreq, particularly Egypt and Iraq, which were showing signs of stalling 
fertility declines in the last 5 to 10 years.5 
In 2015, more than three quarters of the population of the region was concentrated in seven countries: Egypt, 
the Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen (listed in descending order of population size). 
The share of this group of countries is stable across the period 1980-2050. Under the medium fertility variant, 
Egypt will have the largest population in the region in 2050—a little over 150 million—followed by Iraq (84 
million) and the Sudan (80 million). Besides Algeria, the population of which is expected to reach 56 million, 
all other Arab countries are likely to have less than 50 million inhabitants in 2050 under the medium fertility 
                                                                
4 Al Awad and Chartouni, 2010. 
5 El-Zanaty and Way, 2009; Egypt, Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates and ICF International, 2015; 
Iraq, Central Organization for Statistics & Information Technology, and Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office, 2007 and 2012. 
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variant. The smallest 10 countries in terms of population size are likely to have populations of less than 10 
million, ranging from 1.2 million in Djibouti to 9.8 million in the State of Palestine.  
Figure 3. Total population of Arab countries, 1980-2050: 2012 estimations and 2015 projections, 
medium, low and high fertility variants  
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects (WPP): The 2012 Revision and The 
2015 Revision. 
Figure 4. Relative share of population by subregion, 1980-2050  
(medium variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
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Mashreq and GCC countries are home to a relatively stable number of inhabitants over the period 1980-2050. 
The share of the Mashreq subregion in the region’s population had slightly decreased from 1980 to 2015  
(44 to 42 per cent), but it is projected to increase slightly in the future. The share of GCC countries had slightly 
increased, from 9 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 2015. More important changes will occur in the Maghreb 
and Arab LDCs, with the share of the former continuously declining from 29 per cent in 1980 to 23 per cent 
in 2015 then 18 per cent in 2050, and the share of the latter increasing from 19 per cent in 1980 to 21 per cent 
in 2015 then 25 per cent in 2050. This difference in trends is mostly due to differences in the transition to lower 
fertility levels (figure 4). 
A breakdown of the population by sex shows that the number of males increased from 84 million in 1980 to 
203 million in 2015; it is expected to reach 335 million in 2050. Likewise, the female population increased 
from 82 million in 1980 to 189 million in 2015, and is expected to be 324 million in 2050. Figure 5 shows that 
the sex ratio, which had recorded an increase from 1980 to 2015, mostly due to the GCC countries, is expected 
to decline during the period 2015-2050. 
Figure 5. Sex ratio, Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050  
(medium variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
B. Fertility levels and trends 
In the period 1980-1985, Arab countries exhibited different fertility patterns, but women had in general what 
was then considered exceptionally high numbers of children, particularly in relation with the level of 
socioeconomic development (figure 6, annex tables 3A and 4A).6 The lowest level of fertility, measured by 
the total fertility rate (TFR),7 was observed in Lebanon (3.7), and the highest in Yemen (8.8), with most other 
countries ranging between 5.1 and 7.0. The 1980-1985 TFR was also above 7 in the Comoros, Somalia, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, the State of Palestine and Jordan. In 2010-2015, with the exception of Somalia where women 
had on average more than six children, TFR ranged between 2.1 and 4.5. Countries with more than four 
children per woman were mostly Arab LDCs (Comoros, Mauritania and the Sudan), and fertility was also high 
in such Mashreq countries as Iraq and the State of Palestine. A few countries had a TFR close to the 
                                                                
6 Courbage, 1999. 
7 The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of 
their reproductive period if they were subject during this period to the fertility rates observed in a given year. Its calculation assumes 
that there is no mortality. TFR is expressed as a number of children per woman. 
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replacement level of about 2.1, and some were even below that level, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Lebanon, which had the lowest TFR with 1.7 children per woman on average in 
2015. In most Maghreb countries, TFRs ranged between 2.2 and 2.9. Further declines are projected for 2045-
2050 in all countries, with TFRs ranging between 1.7 and 2.9 and with Maghreb and GCC countries, and 
Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic all below the replacement level.  
Figure 6. Total fertility rates in the Arab region: minimum, maximum and 20 to 80 per cent range,  
1980-1985, 2010-2015 and 2045-2050 (medium variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
Figure 7 shows the rapid declines of TFRs that have been observed since the 1980s in most subregions, and 
since 1990 in all, including in Arab LDCs. However, there was been a rise again in the Maghreb and Mashreq 
in the period 2005-2015, particularly in countries that experienced uprisings since December 2010 such as 
Tunisia and Egypt. Between 2008 and 2014, the total fertility rate increased in Egypt from 3.0 to 3.5 children.8 
A slight increase in fertility was also observed in other Maghreb countries such as Algeria and Morocco, and 
a stall was observed in Iraq.  
Figure 7. Total fertility rates in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
                                                                
8 El-Zanaty and Way 2009; Egypt, Ministry of Health and Population and others, 2015. 
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The pattern of fertility in the different age groups is also interesting and varies between the Arab subregions 
(figure 8). In Arab LDCs and Mashreq countries, the fertility decline registered between 1980-1985 and 2010-
2015 was more important in the 25-29 age group (-31 per cent) compared with the 20-24 age group (-26 per 
cent). This is unusual: in the more “classical” pattern of fertility transition, fertility declines among women of 
the 20-24 age group before it does among those aged 25-29 years. Higher averages of marriage age, together 
with non-demographic determinants such as family planning and participation in higher education and the 
labour force, lead to the postponement of fertility declines to later ages. This pattern reveals the persistence of 
quite high fertility at a young reproductive age in Arab countries, which could hinder further rapid fertility 
declines. In the GCC countries, fertility has declined between 1980-1985 and 2010-2015 for the age group 15-
24, and women aged 25-29 years were the most fertile. The pattern was quite different in the Maghreb, where 
fertility peaked in 2010-2015 for both the 25-29 and 30-34 age groups. 
Figure 8. Age-specific fertility rates by subregion, 1980-1985, 2010-2015, 2045-2050  
(medium variant, percentage) 
  
  
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
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C. Mortality levels and trends 
With life expectancy improving for men and women since the 1980s, the Arab region has generally been 
registering lower crude death rates (annex table 5A). Socioeconomic development has translated into progress 
in the reduction of deaths from infectious diseases and injuries in most countries, which are witnessing an 
epidemiological transition and the mounting burden of non-communicable diseases, such as heart diseases and 
mental disorders.9 Figure 9 shows that the Maghreb subregion has registered the biggest progress in terms of 
life expectancy and is on the path to achieving levels similar to those of the GCC countries. The Mashreq, on 
the other hand, has been experiencing a stall in mortality decline since 2005, due to the war in Iraq which has 
caused a two-year loss in life expectancy for men between 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 (0.9 years for women), 
and the war in the Syrian Arab Republic which has caused a loss of 8 years of life expectancy (1.1 years for 
women) between the same two periods. Arab LDCs still lag behind the other subregions in terms of life 
expectancy and are expected to bridge the gap very slowly in the coming years. 
Figure 9. Life expectancy at birth by sex and subregion, 1980-2050 (medium variant) 
A.  Men B.  Women 
  
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
Note: Data weighted by population. 
In 2045-2050, Arab LDCs and Iraq will register life expectancies below 75 years for both sexes (Iraq, 74; 
Comoros, 70; Djibouti, 68; Somalia, 65; Sudan, 70; Mauritania, 67; and Yemen, 69). At the other end of the 
scale, life expectancy at birth will be above 80 years in Lebanon (87); Algeria (81); Morocco (81); Bahrain 
(81); Oman (84); Qatar (84); and the United Arab Emirates (83).  
The difference in life expectancy between men and women is following different paths in the subregions 
(figure 10, annex tables 6A and 7A). In 1980-1985, women on average had a life expectancy of three years 
more compared with men in the Maghreb, GCC countries and Arab LDCs. In 2010-2015, the difference 
narrowed down to 2.2 years in GCC countries, increased to 3.8 years in the Maghreb, and stayed more or less 
constant at about 3 years in Arab LDCs. Mashreq countries stand out: the difference between men and women 
in terms of life expectancy is much bigger there. It was around 5.7 years in 1980-1985, mostly due to the high 
death toll of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). The gap was then narrowing down but was still above 4.5 years, 
                                                                
9 Mokdad and others, 2014. 
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9 
but it started widening again after 2005 because of the wars in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, by which 
men are more affected than women.  
The difference between life expectancies of women and men is expected to continue to decline in the GCC 
countries under the medium variant (+1.8 years in 2045-2050). It is also expected to decrease in the Maghreb 
after 2020 (+2.8 years in 2045-50). It is likely to increase in Arab LDCs to +4 years, but would still be largest 
in the Mashreq, with +5 years of life expectancy at birth for women compared with men.  
Figure 10. Gender gap in life expectancy at birth in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 
(medium variant) 
 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 
Infant mortality rates (annex table 8A) and child mortality rates (annex table 9A) show similar trends. The 
overall decline is the result of the increase in the level of socioeconomic development. Egypt had one of the 
highest infant mortality rates in the early 1980s and managed to reduce it by more than 80 per cent in 2015, 
from 107 to 19 deaths per 100,000 live births. Mortality was also greatly reduced in the GCC countries, with 
rates for infants of less than 9 deaths per 100,000 live births in all countries except Saudi Arabia (15 deaths 
per 100,000 live births). Children are also victims of war and have experienced a sudden increase in their 
mortality rates in countries such as Iraq, Libya, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic (figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Infant mortality by country, 1980-2050 (medium variant) 
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Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.  
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D. Population distribution 
1. Urbanization 
More than half of the Arab region’s population has been living in urban settings since the 1990s. Only Arab 
LDCs remain mostly rural and are likely to be so until 2045, according to United Nations projections.10 The 
GCC subregion has been one of the most rapidly urbanizing in the world and has used its oil resources to 
achieve that change.11 In 2015, 85 per cent of its population resided in an urban setting. Absolute numbers of 
city dwellers have also increased throughout the region (figure 12). The urban population of the Mashreq is 
estimated to have more than doubled between 1985 and 2015, from 43 to 89 million people. As for Arab LDCs 
and GCC countries, their urban population reached in 2015 more than four times its 1980 size.  
In the Maghreb, the increase in the urban population has been occurring mostly in cities with 1-5 million 
inhabitants (figure 13). There are only seven large cities in the subregion: Casablanca, in which the number of 
inhabitants has increased from 2.1 million in 1980 to 3.5 million in 2015, Algiers (2.6 million inhabitants in 
2015), Rabat (2.0 million), Tunis (2.0 million), Fes (1.2 million), Marrakech (1.1 million) and Tripoli (1.1 
million). In Arab LDCs and GCC countries, some cities are growing to house 5-10 million people, such as 
Riyadh (6.4 million) and Khartoum (5.1 million). The Mashreq is the subregion with the highest concentration 
of large and megacities, such as Cairo (18.8 million inhabitants),12 Bagdad (6.6 million), Alexandria (4.8 
million), Aleppo (3.6 million), Damascus (2.6 million) and Beirut (2.2 million). Further urbanization is likely 
to take place until 2030, but no new megacities are likely to appear. These 2014 United Nations urbanization 
estimates do not take the impact of the wars in the Mashreq subregion into consideration. Vast proportions of 
the population of major Syrian cities have been internally displaced, or have left the country as refugees and 
have mostly fled to other Mashreq cities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.  
Figure 12. Urban population in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 
A.  Urban population in numbers 
(thousands) 
B.  Urban population as a percentage  
of total population 
  
Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. Available from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup (accessed 30 
September 2015). 
                                                                
10 Data from the World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. Available from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup. Accessed 30 
September 2015. 
11 El-Arifi, 1986. 
12 Typically megacities have above 10 million inhabitants. 
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Figure 13. Population of urban agglomerations with 300,000 inhabitants or more in 2014, Arab 
subregions, 1980-2030 (thousands) 
  
  
  
Abbreviations: T, thousands; M, million. 
Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision. Available from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup (accessed 30 
September 2015).  
2. Rural-urban migration 
In the period 1980-2000, rural zones of the Arab region were losing large segments of population, mostly as a 
result of migration to urban agglomerations. Such migration flows were less important after 2000, as shown in 
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annex table 10A, particularly in Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia, where the rate of decline of the percentage rural13 was less than -2 per cent, and in most cases -1 per cent.  
3. International migration 
International migration has always shaped the demographic profile of the Arab region, today even more so due 
to with the flows of asylum-seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. Arab countries have also long 
been major destination countries for labour migrants. According to the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, in 2013, the region was hosting 13 per cent of the world’s migrants and 3 in 10 
migrants of the developing region (table 1).14 Between 2000 and 2013, Arab countries hosted 14 million new 
international migrants, bringing the total to nearly 30 million. In 2013, migrants represented 8 per cent of the 
population of Arab countries. Out of the 20 countries with at least one million inhabitants and hosting the 
highest proportion of international migrants in 2013, 8 were Arab countries. Among those were three Arab oil-
producing countries: the United Arab Emirates, in which 84 per cent of the population were migrants, Qatar 
(74 per cent) and Kuwait (60 per cent). The share of international migrants and refugees is also above 40 per 
cent of the population in Jordan. In absolute terms, 3 Arab countries were among the 20 countries with the 
highest number of migrants in the world in 2013, namely Saudi Arabia (9.1 million migrants), the United Arab 
Emirates (7.8 million) and Jordan (2.9 million).  
There are three distinct migration flows in the Arab region. Maghreb countries such as Algeria, Libya, Morocco 
and Tunisia have been important countries of origin of migrants to European countries since the 1960s. More 
recently, those countries have experienced new forms of migration and have become transit and destination 
countries for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.  
Mashreq countries have mostly been countries of origin for migrants to the oil-producing GCC countries, while 
also hosting refugees. GCC countries have been among the major world destinations of migrant workers since 
the oil boom in the 1970s. Those workers came mostly from Asia, notably India and Pakistan, but also from 
other Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. In 2013, 74 per cent of all migrants living in the Arab 
countries lived in the GCC countries, and Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 30 per cent. As for the Arab LDCs, 
they have mostly been countries of origin of migrants to the Maghreb and GCC countries.  
The Arab region has one of the lowest shares of female migrants (37 per cent) compared with other regions, 
where women usually account for half of the migrant population. Only in the Comoros and the State of 
Palestine can one find a slightly higher share of women compared with men in 2013 among the stock of 
migrants. The share of women in the migrant population is declining across all countries compared to 2000, 
except in the case of the State of Palestine. However, women’s share is expected to increase because of demand 
for employees in the health sector, and care and domestic services, especially in the GCC countries.  
 
                                                                
13 The percentage rural is the rural population as a percentage of the total population.  
14 This section is based on Goujon and Barakat, 2010. Most data do not take into account the migration flows that have occurred 
after 2013 (the latest year for which United Nations data on migration are available), as a result of the continuing civil war in the Syrian 
Arab Republic and the turmoil in neighbouring countries, particularly in Iraq. There were about 4 million Syrians refugees in 2015. It 
is estimated that some 300,000 to 400,000 had fled to Europe, and that Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon hosted 90 per cent of Syrian 
refugees (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015). 
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Table 1. Estimated number of international migrants in Arab countries, 2000, 2010 and 2013 
Country 
International 
migrants at 
mid-year 
% 
women 
% 
population 
% 
refugees 
Net 
migration 
rate(a) 
International 
migrants at 
mid-year 
% 
women 
% 
population 
% 
refugees 
Net 
migration 
rate (a) 
International 
migrants at 
mid-year 
% 
women 
% 
population 
% 
refugees 
Net 
migration 
rate (a) 
 2000 2000 2000 2000 
1995-
2000 2010 2010 2010 2010 2005-2010 2013 2013 2013 2013 
2010-
2015 
Comoros 13799 52.8 2.6 0.1 -2.3 12618 52.0 1.8 0.0 -3.0 12511 51.7 1.7 0.0 -2.7 
Djibouti 110201 47.1 15.2 21.1 -4.8 114188 44.9 13.7 13.2 -5.0 123537 44.5 14.2 16.5 -3.7 
Somalia 20087 47.1 0.3 2.8 -2.9 23995 46.2 0.2 8.1 -7.8 24593 45.8 0.2 8.5 -7.9 
Sudan 801883 49.7 2.3 51.7 -3.7 612663 49.1 1.7 29.1 -2.9 446707 49.2 1.2 31.2 -4.2 
Mauritania 62593 42.0 2.3 0.5 0.8 89178 41.6 2.5 30.0 -1.2 90206 41.4 2.3 29.4 -1.0 
Yemen 143495 43.8 0.8 42.2 -1.2 285837 40.7 1.3 66.5 0.0 314683 40.7 1.3 68.2 -0.4 
Bahrain 244937 30.8 36.7 0.0 14.0 666172 27.8 53.2 0.0 59.5 729357 27.8 54.7 0.0 4.5 
Kuwait 1500442 32.5 78.7 0.2 11.0 1871537 30.0 62.6 0.0 39.2 2028053 30.0 60.2 0.0 29.8 
Oman 623608 20.8 28.4 0.0 -18.8 1017696 19.9 36.3 0.0 13.6 1112032 19.0 30.6 0.0 65.2 
Qatar 470731 28.0 79.3 0.0 15.7 1456168 20.1 83.2 0.0 131.4 1600955 20.8 73.8 0.0 36.3 
Saudi 
Arabia 5263388 33.2 26.1 0.1 0.6 8429983 29.6 30.9 0.0 6.2 9060433 29.0 31.4 0.0 5.7 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 2446675 28.2 80.8 0.0 35.9 7316611 25.3 86.7 0.0 109.1 7826981 25.3 83.7 0.0 9.3 
Egypt 169149 46.8 0.3 4.0 -0.6 280714 43.8 0.4 33.9 -0.7 297448 43.6 0.4 32.0 -0.5 
Iraq 146910 31.1 0.6 87.4 -0.2 83111 30.1 0.3 41.7 -3.2 95780 29.8 0.3 36.7 3.3 
Jordan 1927845 49.0 40.4 81.5 -8.3 2722983 49.2 42.2 87.1 15.2 2925780 49.3 40.2 87.7 6.5 
Lebanon 692913 49.0 21.4 54.8 -1.9 820655 47.9 18.9 56.4 8.8 849721 47.6 17.6 55.9 49.1 
State of 
Palestine 275202 54.7 8.6 .. 4.8 258032 55.6 6.4 .. -4.7 256517 55.6 5.9 .. -2.0 
Syrian 
Arab 
Republic 832273 49.0 5.1 46.6 -1.7 1661922 48.9 7.7 89.1 3.8 1394227 48.9 6.4 89.0 -41.1 
Algeria 250110 45.2 0.8 67.0 -1.1 244964 45.2 0.7 38.4 -2.1 270407 45.0 0.7 34.8 -0.8 
Libya 558770 35.5 10.8 2.0 0.3 699144 34.5 11.6 1.1 -2.7 755974 34.1 12.2 1.3 -16.0 
Morocco 53124 50.1 0.2 2.8 -4.0 50113 48.3 0.2 1.6 -3.7 50771 47.7 0.2 1.4 -1.9 
Tunisia 36212 49.8 0.4 1.2 -0.8 33583 49.7 0.3 0.3 -0.6 36526 49.2 0.3 11.2 -0.6 
Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013, accessed 30 September 2015); and 
World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, DVD edition, 2015) for net migration rates marked (a). 
Notes: The 2000 estimates for the Sudan include South Sudan. The estimates for the State of Palestine include East Jerusalem. Refugees are not part of the foreign-born migrant stock in the State of 
Palestine. 
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Figure 14. Net number of migrants in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050  
(medium variant, thousands)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: 
The 2015 Revision. 
Figure 15. Net migration rate in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium variant) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: 
The 2015 Revision. 
4. Displacement  
Annex table 13A shows that the number of asylum-seekers and refugees, including people in refugee-like 
situations, has been rapidly increasing, particularly after the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011. Refugees 
and asylum-seekers originate mainly from five countries: the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and the State of 
Palestine, and Somalia and the Sudan. These five countries account for more than 95 per cent of all refugees 
in the period 2000-2014.  
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The war in the Syrian Arab Republic has generated a dramatic humanitarian situation. According to the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),15 in December 2015, some 4.3 million 
Syrian were refugees and 6.6 million were internally displaced. Most Syrian refugees remained in the Middle 
East, in Turkey (2.1 million), Lebanon (1.1 million, representing more than a quarter of the Lebanese 
population), Jordan (600,000), Iraq (250,000), and Egypt (130,000). About 10 per cent had traveled to Europe, 
the majority to Germany and Sweden.  
Irregular migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa through the Maghreb have become substantial, particularly 
since 2014, due to several conflicts in Cameroon, Chad, the Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria, South 
Sudan and the Sudan, which have caused the displacement of large segments of the population. 
Extreme migration flows as the ones witnessed currently can change the population size and composition of 
countries significantly compared with United Nations projections, particularly if the host country's population 
is of small size, like Lebanon or the GCC countries. There is uncertainty as to if and when such flows might 
slow down, and whether labour migrants would return to their home countries.  
E. Age structure 
The age pyramids presented in annex figure 1A show the structure of the population of Arab countries in terms 
of age and sex, and their evolution across time. 
In 1980, most countries had a very young age structure, as shown by the large bases of the pyramids, and 44 
per cent of the population belonged to the 0-14 age group (annex table 14A). The rest were overwhelmingly 
of working age (15-64 years old) and only 4 per cent were aged 65 and above, with 0.4 per cent were above 
80 years old. The 1980s show quite homogenous features in terms of the age composition of the population, 
as most Arab societies had been experiencing many decades of high fertility. 
In 2015, the patterns of demographic transition that were already in place in 1980 became more visible. Arab 
LDCs still had a very young age structure with more than 40 per cent of the population aged 0-14 years, with 
the exception of Djibouti, which had the lowest fertility rate of the subregion. In the Mashreq, more than one 
third of the population was in the 0-14 age group. The share was higher in Iraq (41 per cent), the State of 
Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic (37 per cent), and lower in Lebanon (24 per cent). The Maghreb was 
more advanced in the demographic transition, with the share of young people in the population at 27 per cent, 
reaching as low as 23 per cent in Tunisia. The GCC countries had the lowest share of youth, ranging from 14 
per cent in the United Arab Emirates to 21 per cent in Oman, and the working-age people represented 73 per 
cent of the population. However, the age structure of GCC countries is skewed by international labour 
migration.  
The share of persons aged above 65 in the Arab region’s population is still very low. In 2015, it was highest 
in Tunisia, at 8 per cent, but it was less than 5 per cent on average, and only 1 per cent of the population was 
above 80 years of age. If ageing was still not visible in 2015, it will be in 2050 under all fertility variants, as 
11 per cent of the population will be above 65 years of age. The figure might not seem very high, as it 
equivalent to that registered in Europe in 1970 when ageing was not considered an issue, but that is due to 
subregional disparities. Indeed, only 6 per cent of the population in the Arab LDCs will be aged above 65, but 
the figure will actually be above 15 per cent in many other countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), reaching as high as 23 per cent in Lebanon and 20 per cent in Tunisia. 
The two countries will thus have surpassed faster ageing European countries, and will have registered levels 
higher than that of Japan in the period 2005-2010. The share of the region’s population above the age of 80 
will also increase to 2 per cent; it will even reach 7 per cent in Lebanon where progress in life expectancy is 
expected to be fastest. 
                                                                
15 See http://www.unocha.org/syria.  
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Dependency ratios 
The age structure of a population affects the dependency ratio, which measures the ratio of the not-productive 
population, i.e. children (aged 0-14 years) and older persons (aged 65+), to the productive population of 
working age (15-64 years).16  
As shown in figure 16, the total dependency ratio fell from 91 dependents per 100 persons of working age in 
1980 to 60 in 2010. Two changes occurred after that: first, child dependency ratios, which were declining very 
fast and driving the drop in the total dependency ratio, started decreasing at a slower pace as a result of stalling 
fertility. Secondly, the old-age dependency ratio, which was stable at a low level until 2010, started increasing 
at a faster pace. As a result, from 2010 onwards, the total dependency ratio remained at about 60 dependents 
for 100 persons of working age. Under the medium variant, the total dependency ratio will further decrease 
until 2040 and then start increasing again. 
Figure 16. Dependency ratio in the Arab region and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium variant) 
A.  Child dependency ratio B.  Old-age dependency ratio 
  
C.  Total dependency ration 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: 
The 2015 Revision. 
                                                                
16 The age groups can be set differently for the dependency ratio calculations (0-19 years for children or 15-60 years for the 
working age, for example), but those settings do not affect substantively the demographic change trends described in this section. 
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In the Arab LDCs, since population growth through high fertility and limited progress in mortality are still 
dominant traits, the child and total dependency ratios are higher compared with other subregions, but have also 
been declining steadily since 1990. The level of 60 dependents for 100 persons of working age is expected to 
be reached around 2040 in the subregion.  
The total dependency ratio is lowest in GCC countries (below 40 dependents for 100 persons of working age 
in 2015), with the population consisting overwhelmingly of men of working age as a result of labour migration. 
It is higher in the Maghreb (51/100 in 2015), the group of countries where ageing of the population is more 
visible than in other subregions, and higher still in the Mashreq (66/100 in 2015). However, thoseles mauvaises 
impressions des gens qui nous entourent. les mauvaises impressions des gens qui nous entourent. three 
subregions are expected to experience little change until 2030 under the medium variant. After that year, their 
total dependency ratios will increase, chiefly as a result of an increase in the old-age dependency ratio.  
F. Concluding remarks 
Two main results emerge from the analysis of demographic trends in the Arab region. The first is that the region’s 
features have changed quite rapidly with socioeconomic development. There were substantial declines in fertility 
and mortality rates and, consequently, substantial ageing in a majority of countries. This trend is likely to continue 
until 2050. The Arab LDCs, where poverty levels remain high, are at an earlier stage of the demographic 
transition and will converge slowly towards the demographic features observed in the rest of the region. 
The second result of the analysis is the uncertainty about future trends, due to the conflicts that have been affecting 
large segments of the population in the Arab region. The Maghreb, Mashreq and Arab LDCs have been directly 
stricken, which is affecting the mortality rates of children and adults, but also the rates of internal and external 
displacement. Hence, the population figures and projections that are reported should be appraised carefully. 
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 REALIZING THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND 
A. Introduction 
Economists have long discussed the direction and importance of the impact of population growth on economic 
growth. Over time, the perception of that impact has changed from negative to positive. In the 1980s, several 
analyses concluded that there was neither a positive nor a negative correlation between the two. According to 
Bloom and Williamson (1998), and Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003), changes in the age composition of a 
population, not population growth, can have an effect on economic performance. When the working-age 
population grows faster than the overall population, the economy is positively affected. It is the case during 
the intermediate phase of the demographic transition. 
B. Demographic dividend: concept and calculations 
1. Definition  
A demographic transition can create an economic advantage for a society when the largest share of its 
population is in the productive age bracket. The transition, which is a change from high to low fertility and 
mortality levels, entails significant changes in the population’s age composition. It sets out with a decline in 
mortality thanks to medical advances, which increases the number of surviving children in a family. There is 
usually a time lag before couples adjust their fertility downwards; the transition thus also includes a phase of 
population growth during which the share of infants and children in the population rises. This increases the 
economic burden on persons of working age. In the intermediate phase of the transition, fertility and population 
growth start to decrease. The share of the working-age population grows and rates of child dependency decline, 
with the number of elderly remaining relatively small. The final stage of the demographic transition begins 
when mortality and fertility both reach low levels: the working-age population no longer grows but instead 
starts ageing.17 Industrialized countries already went through this transition, whereas other countries are still 
in the early and intermediate stages.  
The link between changes in a country’s age composition and its economic performance stems from the fact 
that persons of different ages adopt different economic behaviours. Young persons need support to access 
health and education services, whereas the elderly need health care and a retirement income of some sort. 
Persons of working age have labour earnings and savings.18 During the intermediate phase of the demographic 
transition, with the share of the working-age population growing, the number of elderly still being small and 
the number of dependent children declining, freeing up resources that can be invested in economic 
development or family welfare becomes possible.19 Financial resources become available to Governments and 
households, and per capita income rises. 
According to Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003), the most important mechanisms through which the 
demographic dividend works are labour supply, savings and human capital. Potential labour supply is high 
when the population of working age constitutes the largest proportion of the overall population. With declining 
fertility and smaller family sizes, women are also more likely to be economically active. The degree to which 
people of working age save money depends on several factors, but it can be expected that households with 
more resources available due to smaller family sizes increase savings, which is beneficial for investment. If 
the State invests in health programmes for children, this will lower infant and child mortality, and with children 
increasingly surviving to adult age, families become smaller.20 Increased life expectancy and a lower number 
of children create incentives for parents to invest more in the health and education of their children. This will 
                                                                
17 Bloom and Williamson, 1998; National Transfer Accounts (NTA), 2012. 
18 Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003. 
19 Mason and Lee, 2006. 
20 Gribble and Bremner, 2012. 
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push demographic trends towards lower levels of fertility. Finally, a healthier and better-educated work force 
is more productive, and due to the positive association between education and wages, income will increase.  
However, changes in the age structure alone do not guarantee higher productivity and accelerated economic 
growth; they offer only the potential for it. The above-described mechanisms require an enabling social and 
economic policy environment and investments so that their full potential and the demographic dividend are 
realized.21 Large numbers of potential workers can only be productive if the supply for labour meets the 
demand, which requires sound macroeconomic policies and flexibility in the labour market. The incentive for 
people to save depends, among other things, on the existence of a financial system that allows and encourages 
them to do so. Investing in children’s health and education is only possible through an adequate institutional 
set-up.  
Creating a macroeconomic environment in which employment is available to large numbers of young people 
is essential to reap the benefits of the first demographic dividend. If opportunities are not created for workers 
to productively contribute to the economy, the demographic dividend will not materialize. A prerequisite for 
this is the investment in young people’s health and education, since only then are they endowed with the human 
capital necessary to become productive workers.  
A second demographic dividend, based on individuals’ accumulation of wealth, has been defined. It occurs 
when people of working age accumulate assets, such as pension funds or property, in order to provide for their 
retirement needs,22 particularly when the family or government are not expected to provide for such needs. 
Accumulation of wealth will have positive effects on economic growth, and unlike the first dividend that ends 
once the age structure becomes unfavorable, the second dividend can last endlessly.  
2. Calculation of the demographic dividend  
As previously mentioned, the total or age dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of persons aged less than 15 
and more than 64 years to the persons of working age (15-64 years), has started to decrease in the Arab region 
since 1980, and is expected to do so until 2050. Arab LDCs even show a monotonic decline of that ratio, while 
in the other three subregions there is a slight increase starting 2012 (figure 17A). GCC countries, which host 
high numbers of migrant workers, have the lowest age dependency ratio in the period 2010-2030, with less 
than 40 dependents per 100 persons of working age. All subregions show a general trend of higher shares of 
working-age persons in the population over time (figure 17B).  
The decrease in the age dependency ratio together with an increase in the working-age population creates an 
opportunity to boost savings and investments. This phenomenon is referred to as the window of opportunity 
for a demographic dividend. The methodologies adopted to estimate the first demographic dividend have 
varied between researchers and over time; however, the degree to which economic dependency changes over 
an individual’s life course has been always included in the calculations. At young and older ages, individuals 
are mainly consumers, supported through transfers—public and private—from persons of working age or 
making use of previous savings. Most persons of working age, on the other hand, are consumers and producers 
at the same time. Some calculations of the demographic dividend are based solely on demographic data, while 
others include dependency ratios with crude weights to account for the fact that people have varying degrees 
of dependency at different ages.  
 
                                                                
21 Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003. 
22 Mason and Lee, 2006. 
22 
Figure 17. Age dependency ratio (A) and share of the working-age population (B) in Arab subregions, 1980-2050 
(percentage) 
  
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 
Elaborate approaches were presented by Mason (2005), Mason and Kinugasa (2008), Mason and Lee (2012), 
and Prskawetz and Sambt (2014). Persons of different ages were weighted according to empirical estimates of 
their consumption and production behaviours. The effective number of producers (i.e. the effective labour 
force) and the effective number of consumers were estimated. The support ratio, i.e. the number of producers 
to the number of consumers, was calculated by country. A positive growth rate of that ratio indicated the first 
demographic dividend or demographic window of opportunity (the growth rate is positive when the number 
of producers grows faster than the number of consumers).23 This paper adopts the same method to determine 
the first demographic dividend.  
Specifically, the growth rate of the support ratio is defined as: L(t)/N(t), in which the effective number of 
producers (L) and the effective number of consumers (N) within a country are defined as such:  
 
where P(x, t) represents the number of people aged x in year t, γ(x) is the age profile of labour income, and 
α(x) is the age profile of consumption. Both age profiles are held constant over time.24  
Age-specific data for production and consumption profiles (γ(x), α(x)) come from the National Transfer 
Accounts (NTA) project.25 Production is estimated by labour income. Normalized age profiles of consumption 
and labour income are available for 23 countries only, none in the Arab region.26 Countries in the database 
were split up into high-income and non-high-income ones, based on the World Bank classification.27  
                                                                
23 Mason, 2005. 
24 Prskawetz and Sambt, 2014. 
25 See http://www.ntaccounts.org. 
26 See http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/Consumption%20and%20Labor%20Income%20Profiles%20Release. 
Country-specific consumption and labour income profiles are normalized on the per capita labour income of persons aged 30-49 years. 
27 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. 
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Simple age-specific averages of consumption and labour income were calculated for the two country groups.28 
Figure 18 shows that differences only appear at certain ages: above 60 years old, labour income is significantly 
lower in high-income countries, as is consumption at younger ages. In both country groups, persons aged  
55-59 years have a relative labour income of about three fourths (74 per cent) of those aged 30-49 years. One 
advantage of calculating the demographic dividend in this way is that no arbitrary age thresholds have to be 
set for dependency. The thresholds at which persons are net consumers or net producers can be found by 
looking at the ages where labour income and production profiles intersect. 
Figure 18. Normalized per capita consumption and labour income by age group, high-income and non-
high-income countries 
 
Abbreviation: HI, high-income.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Transfer Account project. Available from http://www.ntaccounts.org 
(accessed February 2015). 
Note: Original data by single years of age were aggregated using simple averages for 5-year age groups.  
The average profiles of labour income and consumption were then used as age-specific weights that were 
applied to population data on Arab countries from the United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2015 
Revision, resulting in the effective number of producers and consumers for each country over the period  
1980-2050.29 The applied weights, presented in table 2, were kept constant while population data varied  
over time.30  
 
                                                                
28 The 13 high-income countries considered are Austria, Chile, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Slovenia, Republic of 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Uruguay and the United States of America. The 10 non-high-income countries are Brazil, China, Costa 
Rica, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines and Thailand. 
29 The weights of high-income countries were only applied for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (GCC countries).  
30 Further details on the calculation method are provided in NTA, 2012; Prskawetz and Sambt, 2014; and on the NTA website, 
available from www.ntaccounts.org. 
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Table 2. Age-specific weights of labour income and consumption, high-income and non-high-income 
countries 
  
High-income countries Non high-income countries   
Age Labour income Consumption Labour income Consumption 
0-4 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.29 
5-9 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.40 
10-14 0.00 0.57 0.01 0.50 
15-19 0.08 0.61 0.12 0.60 
20-24 0.39 0.60 0.38 0.65 
25-29 0.73 0.60 0.67 0.66 
30-34 0.91 0.60 0.88 0.66 
35-39 0.99 0.59 1.01 0.66 
40-44 1.05 0.59 1.07 0.65 
45-49 1.05 0.61 1.05 0.66 
50-54 0.95 0.63 0.91 0.68 
55-59 0.74 0.66 0.74 0.69 
60-64 0.40 0.67 0.45 0.68 
65-69 0.15 0.66 0.30 0.68 
70-74 0.06 0.66 0.20 0.69 
75-79 0.03 0.68 0.13 0.69 
80+ 0.01 0.75 0.05 0.71 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Transfer Account project. Available from 
http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/Consumption%20and%20Labor%20Income%20Profiles%20Release (accessed February 
2015). 
One limitation in our calculation of the demographic dividend is that it is based on the production and 
consumption patterns of non-Arab countries. Still, in the absence of country-specific data, the approach 
adopted here provides good regional estimates. Sensitivity analyses in Mason (2005) indeed showed that 
variation in production and consumption weights did not matter for general conclusions drawn from 
calculations of regional demographic dividend estimates. However, empirical data from Africa have also 
shown that young people there have much lower incomes compared with mid-age earners in Asia or Latin 
America, which dampens the potential of the demographic dividend.31 Income profiles based on data from non-
Arab countries might thus lead to an overestimation of the demographic dividend in the Arab region. Reliable 
country-specific data are essential for the provision of sound policy advice.  
C. Demographic dividend in Arab countries  
This section will only present results for the Maghreb, Mashreq and Arab LDCs. The reasons are manifold: 
the high and fluctuating number of labour migrants in GCC countries affects past and future population 
estimates and leads to an erratic behavior of the support ratio. This makes it hard, if not impossible, to define 
starting and ending points for the window of opportunity. Moreover, substantial proportions of the income of 
labour migrants are transferred to their home countries outside the subregion, and many older migrants return 
to their home countries upon retirement. Results for GCC countries are thus not reported.  
1. Subregional overview 
In the Maghreb countries, an increase of the ratio of the effective number of producers to the effective number 
of consumers can be observed from 1980 until about 2020. The annual growth of the support ratio is expected 
to remain positive until 2021 (table 3 figure 19). Therefore, the window of opportunity opened in 1981, or 
even before that year, and is expected to close in 2021. The window of opportunity opened in 1984 for Mashreq 
countries and is expected to close after 2050 (table 3, figure 20). The Arab LDCs saw their window of 
opportunity for a demographic dividend opening last, in 1991, and it is not expected to close before 2050 (table 
3, figure 21).  
                                                                
31 NTA, 2012. 
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Table 3. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity by subregion 
Subregion Opening year Closing year 
Maghreb  1981 2021 
Mashreq  1984 --- 
Arab LDCs 1991 --- 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 19. Maghreb: support ratio and its 
annual growth rate, 1980-2050 
Figure 20. Mashreq: support ratio and its 
annual growth rate, 1980-2050 
  
Figure 21. Arab LDCs: support ratio and its annual growth rate, 1980-2050 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
2. Window of opportunity by country 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia had a significant increase in the support ratio between 1980 and 2020, 
with Tunisia having the highest ratio over that period (figure 22). The window of opportunity opened for 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 1981, or even before that year, and Libya followed in 1982. It is expected to 
close first for Tunisia in 2019, followed by Algeria in 2021 and in Morocco and Libya in 2025 (table 4). 
26 
All six Mashreq countries showed an increase of the support ratio until 2030 or even later on (figure 23). A 
positive growth rate of the ratio can be observed from the early 1980s for all six countries as well (figure 25  
and figure 26). Interestingly, the demographic window will close in 2028 for Lebanon only, remaining open 
for the other five Mashreq countries beyond 2050 (table 5, figure 26).  
Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen are a very diverse group. They have started 
being in their window of opportunity at very different points in time, some in the early 1980s (such as Djibouti, 
Mauritania and the Sudan), and others around 1990 (such as the Comoros and Yemen). This kind of variation 
was not observed in other subregions. Between 1980 and 2010, the ratio of the effective number of producers 
to the effective number of consumers decreased in Somalia (figure 24). Therefore, the demographic window 
of opportunity opened only recently, in 2013, in that country (figure 25, table 6). The annual growth rate of 
the support ratio is expected to remain positive for all countries beyond 2050, with the exception of Djibouti, 
where it might become negative in 2046 (table 6, figure 26).  
Figure 22. Support ratio in countries  
of the Maghreb, 1980-2050 
Figure 23. Support ratio in countries 
of the Mashreq, 1980-2050 
 
Figure 24. Support ratio in Arab LDCs, 1980-2050 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 25. Growth rate of the support ratio in Arab countries, 1980-2050 (percentage) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 4. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Maghreb countries 
Country Opening year Closing year 
Algeria 1981 2021 
Libya 1982 2025 
Morocco 1981 2025 
Tunisia 1981 2019 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 5. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Mashreq countries  
Country Opening year Closing year 
Egypt 1983 --- 
Iraq 1991 --- 
Jordan 1981 --- 
Lebanon 1981 2028 
State of Palestine 1982 --- 
Syrian Arab Republic 1983 --- 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 6. Time span of the demographic window of opportunity in Arab LDCs 
Country Opening year Closing year 
Comoros 1989 --- 
Djibouti 1981 2046 
Mauritania 1983 --- 
Somalia 2013 --- 
Sudan 1984 --- 
Yemen 1991 --- 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 26. Demographic window of opportunity time span in Maghreb, Mashreq and Arab least 
developed countries between 1980 and 2050 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Between 1980 and 2050, the demographic window of opportunity is expected to open in each of the 16 
investigated Arab countries. For some it will close during that period, but for the majority, it is projected to 
stay open beyond it. Actual age-specific profiles were not available for these countries. To check for the 
robustness of results, a sensitivity analysis was undertaken. High-income country profiles were applied to the 
16 countries instead of the non-high-income ones. Only Algeria and Egypt showed discrepancies, with a shift 
in the closing of the window to 2038 for Algeria and 2043 for Egypt. The closing of the demographic window 
for the remaining countries stayed constant or varied only up to a maximum of four years (in countries such as 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia).  
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 DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR THE REALIZATION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND 
Research about the demographic dividend focuses mainly on two parts of the world: Asia and Africa. In Asia, 
an unprecedented rapid demographic transition and subsequent economic miracle have attracted a lot of 
interest in the relationship between population dynamics and economic growth. Bloom and Williamson (1998) 
estimate that demography accounts for a third to half the growth experienced as “East Asia’s economic 
miracle”, depending on how the miracle is defined. It is undisputed that population dynamics played an 
important role in the economic performance of East Asia in the intermediate phase of its demographic 
transition. Africa has come into focus recently, because many countries there are still at the first stage or the 
very beginning of the second stage of the demographic transition, and the question whether these countries 
will be able to reap the benefits of a demographic dividend has been raised. 
A. Case studies from non-Arab countries 
East Asian countries underwent a rapid demographic transition that begun in the 1960s.32 All of them relied 
on voluntary family planning programmes to reduce population growth once they gave up on pro-natalist 
population policies. Governments in East Asian countries believed that a reduction in fertility was a 
prerequisite for economic development and included the goal of reducing population growth in their national 
development plans.33 The time when this realization and subsequent policies came into effect differed widely 
across countries, starting in the 1950s in Japan and as late as 1970 in Thailand. Following declines in fertility 
were associated with increases in mean ages at marriage and a shift to later childbearing ages. In South Korea 
and Taiwan, for example, women in 1990 married about three and five years later than in 1960, respectively. 
Consequently, between 1960 and 1990, the share of the population aged 20-64 increased in all six countries 
and was highest in Singapore, Japan and South Korea (63 per cent, 62 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively). 
The share of the population below age 20 declined simultaneously, and with the exception of Japan, the elderly 
(65+) comprised only about 5 per cent of the population.34 
In connection with supportive economic and social policies, East Asian countries saw sustained economic 
growth over several decades and a tremendous increase in per capita income. Average annual economic growth 
in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between 1960 and 1990 was 6.66 per cent in South Korea, 
6.52 per cent in Singapore, 6.20 per cent in Taiwan, 5.26 per cent in Japan, 4.45 per cent in Thailand and 3.76 
per cent in Indonesia.35 In Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, the expansion of the manufacturing and services 
sector provided a large number of jobs to absorb the growing number of people of working age. In Thailand 
and Indonesia, the manufacturing and services sector were not as readily able to offer employment for the 
surge in potential workers, and the agricultural sector continued to play a larger role than in countries in the 
North East. The share of the total labour force in agriculture dropped between 1960 and 1990 from 61.3 to 
18.1 per cent in South Korea, from 56.1 to 12.6 per cent in Taiwan, from 33.1 to 7.3 per cent in Japan, and 
from 7.4 to 0.4 per cent in Singapore; but only from 83.7 to 64.1 per cent in Thailand and from 74.8 to 55.0 
per cent in Indonesia.36  
Investments to improve the health of children and education, both beneficial for human capital, also played a 
crucial role, but to varying degrees in different countries. Still, educational attainment increased rapidly and 
                                                                
32 East Asia here refers to six countries in North East and South East Asia, namely Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand), in line with the definition used in Mason, 2001 and 2003. These two sources provide a comprehensive review 
of demographic dynamics and economic development for this region and the information on East Asia presented here draws on these 
two sources. 
33 Tsui, 2001. 
34 Feeney and Mason, 2001. 
35 Bauer, 2001b, table 2.1. 
36 Mason, 2001, table 1.1. 
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the gender gap in education was reduced. This development was supported directly through reductions in 
fertility, freeing up resources at the public and household level. School enrollment rates, expenditure per 
student and educational attainment increased, though at varying patterns.37 For example, whereas tertiary 
enrollment rates were already at 17.0 per cent in Japan in 1970, this value was barely attained in Thailand in 
1990. By this point, Japan and South Korea had already tertiary enrollment rates of 31.5 per cent and 38.7 per 
cent, respectively.  
Increased labour force participation of women, particularly in the formal sector, is another important piece in 
explaining countries’ economic performance. Women’s economic activity was supported by lower fertility, 
changes in the employment structure that came along with higher wages, which is related to increases in 
educational attainment, and changes in policies related to discrimination. This increase in female labour force 
participation started from very different levels and showed differing rates, leading to a very mixed picture 
across the region: whereas participation in Singapore and Taiwan increased significantly from low levels 
(Singapore 1957: 21.6 per cent, 1990: 53 per cent; Taiwan: 1966: 24.5 per cent, 1990: 44.5 per cent), rates in 
Japan remained constant at around 50 per cent in the same period, as they did in Thailand at levels well above 
70 per cent.38 What still changed in Japan and Thailand though was the composition of female employment, 
with shifts away from unpaid family work towards paid employment in Japan and increases in urban labour 
force participation of women in Thailand.39 Bauer 2001a.  
Besides the positive employment trends, increased rate of savings and investment are seen as an important 
factor that enabled economies to profit from the demographic dividend as they did. Saving was encouraged 
through the establishment of financial institutions. This all happened in an overall rather stable macroeconomic 
environment, created through policies that, for example, made sure inflation remained under control. Trade 
liberalization also played a significant role, as countries’ development also depends on global macroeconomic 
conditions. The combination of policies and their exact timing and implementation varied between countries 
and there is not one blueprint that worked for all of them. For example, according to Bauer (2001b), high rates 
of savings and investment were a crucial factor in East Asia’s success story. However, the policies that 
countries implemented to create incentives for increased investment of companies and the degree to which 
foreign investment was supported showed noticeable differences across countries and over time.  
1. Thailand 
Thailand was very successful in reducing its total fertility rate during a period of only 20 years. Whereas 
women had, on average, 5.5 children in 1970, this number dropped to 2.2 by 1990, and has since then decreased 
to levels below 2 children per woman. The Ministry of Public Health promoted voluntary family planning 
through the National Family Planning Programme. In 1970, the Government adopted the first policy to reduce 
population growth and clearly stated its goal of bringing the rate of natural increase down from 3.3 per cent in 
1970 to 2.4 per cent ten years later.40 The increase in the use of contraception, from 15 per cent in 1970 to 
more than 80 per cent in the late 1980s, is seen as the main enabler of the rapid fertility decline. Thailand 
accomplished this fertility decline despite the fact that the majority of its population in 1970 lived in rural 
areas, almost two thirds of working women were part of the agriculture sector, and education levels were rather 
low compared with those of neighbouring countries. There is evidence that Thailand did not reap the benefits 
of the demographic dividend as much as it could have if the labour force participation of women and 
educational attainment levels had been higher.  
                                                                
37 Ahlburg and Jensen, 2001. 
38 Bauer, 2001a, table 14.1. 
39 Bauer, 2001a. 
40  Tsui, 2001, table 16.2. 
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Over time, education levels increased, which is thought to have contributed to the increase of the share  
of single women aged 50-54 years. In the 1970s, the share of 20-24 year old women who had a bachelor  
degree became larger than that of men, and the gap has been increasing since then. The share of married women 
aged 15-49 years decreased as well, but only marginally, accompanied by an increase in the mean age at  
first marriage.41 
Calculations of the first demographic dividend, based on calculations of the economic support ratio analogous 
to the one presented in this report, show that the window of opportunity is currently closing in Thailand, 
entailing that demographic developments will by themselves no longer create a favourable environment 
conducive to economic growth. However, Thailand is preparing for reaping the benefits of the second 
demographic dividend: national efforts are under way to create incentives for people to prepare for old age 
through private savings.  
Presently, although educational attainment has increased and larger shares of each subsequent cohort of young 
people attaint upper-secondary and tertiary education, concern has been voiced about the quality of education. 
In an ever more competitive national and global market, it is not only the degree obtained and the proportion 
of the population that progresses to higher education that matters, but the quality of education is becoming 
increasingly important, not least because it has crucial implications for labour productivity, unemployment 
and underemployment.42 Today, there are large discrepancies in the quality of education between rural and 
urban areas and between provinces. Continuously declining numbers of students due to smaller birth cohorts 
could free up public resources for spending on education, and if education budgets are not cut, this would mean 
higher spending per student.43  
2. South Korea  
South Korea is one of the so-called “Asian Tigers”, with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which got their 
name from their exceptional experience of economic growth in the second half of the last century. Between 
1960 and 1990, South Korea’s per capita GDP grew well above 6 per cent annually.  
In just 25 years, the total fertility rate in South Korea dropped from 5.4 children per women in 1950 to 2.9 in 
1975. In 2013, according to the World Bank data, the country had one of the world’s lowest total fertility rates 
of 1.2. It had started its national family planning campaign in 1962, with the goal of pushing economic growth 
and modernization. The national policy passed in 1961 was aimed at reducing population growth to 2 per cent 
within 10 years.44  
Changes in education policy were also part of government efforts to boost economic performance. By 1990, 
97 per cent of school-age children attended school. Efforts were also made to equip students with the right set 
of skills for economic success.45 This lead to a significant change in the education profile of workers: in 1980, 
51.5 per cent of employed persons in South Korea still had at most primary education. This figure dropped to 
21.4 per cent within 15 years. During the same period, the share of employed persons with tertiary education 
almost tripled, from 6.7 to 18.8 per cent.46  
                                                                
41 UNFPA, 2011. 
42 Wongboonsin and Guest, 2005. 
43 UNFPA, 2011. 
44 Tsui, 2001, table 16.2. 
45 Gribble, 2012. 
46 Okunishi, 2001, table 12.4. 
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In terms of macroeconomic policy, South Korea implemented plans that made their farming and fishing 
industries more productive through attraction of foreign investment. Manufacturing and shipping expanded 
and other industries like iron and steel were established, with foreign investment also playing an important 
role. Increasing capital investment per worker for a period of several decades also contributed to the 
outstanding economic performance. In addition, government programmes to tackle unemployment provided 
jobs for workers.47 The rise in employment of women played a special role in South Korea where labour-
intensive manufacturing was developing rapidly and economic growth was to a large degree export-oriented. 
This change meant a shift away from less productive agricultural work: in 1960, 70.5 per cent of women were 
still employed in the agricultural sector, but this share had decreased to 27 per cent by 1990.  
3. Ireland  
The case of Ireland is interesting in that it showed total fertility rates of 3.5 until the 1980s, which was higher 
than in any other European country at that time.48 One reason for this was undoubtedly that contraception was 
banned until 1979. As soon as family planning through modern forms of contraception became possible, 
fertility started to decline significantly, and the age composition of the population started to shift. With declines 
in youth dependency and increases in the share of the population of working age, Ireland’s demographic 
situation showed all signs for a potential demographic dividend. Two key economic policies have contributed 
to the realization of this dividend. First, Ireland had already opened its economy to foreign direct investment 
and encouraged exports. Secondly, Ireland had since the mid-1960s invested in its human capital through 
education: secondary education became free and tertiary education options were expanded. This led to rising 
shares of young adults with a higher education degree.  
The decline in fertility lead to two favourable developments. First, the female labour force participation 
increased tremendously in the country between 1980 and 2000: among women aged 25-49 years, it reached 
67.7 per cent in 2000, rising from 38.1 per cent in 1983. The trend is still continuing and the rate was of 73.5 
per cent in 2013.49 Secondly, young people were offered enough job opportunities in the national labour market 
as their numbers were reduced. A supporting policy environment, such as large subsidies and tax incentives 
from the European Commission that encouraged foreign direct investment, increased levels of education, 
which translated in a better-educated labour force, and good macroeconomic management accompanied those 
two developments.  
Ireland was thus a “Celtic Tiger”. Like the Asian Tigers, it was successful in using the change in its age 
structure to its advantage by implementing supporting policies that created an environment conducive to 
employment, savings and investment. 
B. Lessons learned  
In the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of demographic dividend had not been developed yet but Governments in 
East Asia believed that continued high population growth was a hindrance for economic development. There 
are two main lessons learned from the case studies presented above. The first one is that fertility reduction is 
a prerequisite to reach an age structure with large shares of people of working age. Such a structure could be 
attained through social and economic development, but progress would be slow. Voluntary family planning 
policies, and information about and access to contraception led to the rapid change in population dynamics 
observed in the case studies. The size of the potential demographic dividend does, to a certain degree, depend 
on the speed of the demographic transition.  
                                                                
47 Gribble, 2012; and Gribble and Bremner 2012. 
48 This section is a summary of information from Bloom and Canning, 2003 and 2006; and Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003. 
49 2015 data from the European Commission Eurostat database. 
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The second lesson learned is that having an advantageous population structure does not automatically lead to 
increases in income per capita and sustained economic growth. This requires a mix of social and economic 
policies that create an environment conducive to development. Of course, the overall development stage in 
which countries found themselves when their population structure shifted towards increasing shares of people 
of working age also had an influence on the policy mix. For example, the promotion of child health still played 
an important role in East Asia when it was no longer the case in Ireland. The increase in female labour force 
participation was deemed important in all contexts, but the degree to which it contributed to the success of 
each country varies. Increases in educational attainment played a central role, and though countries chose 
different paths to achieve this goal, they all succeeded in increasing the skill levels of their populations. Hence, 
the timing and choice of policies differed between countries, but they all underwent changes in necessary areas 
to take advantage of their demographic transition. Bloom and Canning (2011) underline the following 
requisites for realizing the demographic dividend: good governance; solid macroeconomic management; 
carefully designed trade policy; efficient infrastructure; well-functioning financial and labour markets; and 
effective investments in health, education and training. 
The last point in the list above, together with employment opportunities for young adults, is possibly the most 
crucial. The increase in the population of working age that happens in the intermediate stage of the 
demographic transition can be the starting point of a demographic dividend, but it can also become a missed 
opportunity if the overall social and economic conditions are not supportive. In the worst case, the large share 
of young people turns into a burden if productive employment is not available. High levels of unemployment, 
and social and political instability can ensue.50  
C. Recommendations 
Since the size of the potential demographic dividend depends on the speed of the demographic transition, the 
Arab countries that still have relatively high levels of fertility should consider speeding up their transition 
process. Without this acceleration towards lower fertility levels, demographic dividends will be smaller. 
Moreover, as underlined by the case studies presented above, education and decent employment, especially 
for youth and women, are key. Young people in Arab countries should have access to quality education and 
skills, in order to improve their employability. Educational attainment should be increased for all population 
groups. Decent employment opportunities should also be created.  
Table 15A shows that Arab countries differ in terms of their socioeconomic features. GDP per capita ranges 
from below $2,000 in the Arab LCDs to between $20,000 and $100,000 in the GCC countries. Several other 
indicators replicate this diversity: infant mortality, levels of educational attainment of young women, etc. An 
in-depth look at the demographic, social and economic conditions in each country is thus necessary to produce 
sound recommendations on the country level, which should also include such areas as savings, investment, 
trade and taxes. This is, however, beyond the scope of this report. 
                                                                
50 Bloom and Canning, 2011. 
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 CONCLUSION 
The population in the Arab region is expected to keep growing during the next four decades, though at a 
declining annual growth rate. The fertility decrease, ongoing in all countries though stalling in a few recently, 
is likely to continue. The population in the Arab LDCs and Mashreq countries will represent an increasing 
share of the region’s overall population, due to higher fertility levels than in the Maghreb and GCC countries. 
There is no reason to assume that the trend of rising life expectancy will not persist, meaning that more and 
more people will live beyond 65 and even 80 years of age. Increasing life expectancy, in combination with 
lower levels of fertility, will inevitably entail changes in the age composition of societies, even in the face of 
large migration. The proportion of those below age 15 will decrease further and of those aged 65+ will increase. 
The population of working age will expand for some more time before it starts to diminish as well. Needless 
to say, there are stark differences between the country groupings and individual countries in the timing of these 
shifts, given their differing positions in the process of the demographic transition. 
Methods to calculate the window of opportunity for the demographic dividend differ. They may be based  
on purely demographic variables or on life-cycle differences in economic behaviour. However, considering 
these differences gives a better account of people’s needs at various stages of their lives. The calculation  
of demographic dividends based on an elaborate approach that includes those variations is thus favoured in 
this paper.   
Investigating the annual growth rate of the ratio of the number of producers to the number of consumers showed 
that the demographic window of opportunity has opened for all Arab countries. In many countries, this process 
had begun already in the 1980s. In order to create a situation where the demographic dividend becomes a 
reality, two things are necessary. First, the demographic transition has to be in its intermediate phase. Before 
and after this phase, the advantageous demographic situation where the working-age population is growing at 
a faster rate than the population overall is not given. Second, the right policies that improve labour force 
productivity and create an enabling economic environment should be adopted. Reaping the benefits of the 
demographic dividend is not automatic. It takes much more for a demographic change to turn into solid 
economic growth.  
One big incentive for countries to take the necessary steps in order to reap the benefits of the demographic 
dividend should be that many of the necessary measures, such as a beneficial institutional setting for saving 
and investment, good quality education and investments in health, would not just help economically. They will 
also serve to advance societies in general on their path towards development. The role of education cannot be 
emphasized enough. Investing in education will help to bring about lower infant mortality, lower fertility 
(through many mechanisms: smaller desired family size, higher use of contraception, higher labour force 
participation, etc.), better health status, higher life expectancy, higher labour force participation and higher 
productivity. Recent evidence has shown that part of the effect on growth that was previously largely ascribed 
to changes in the population structure is actually a direct consequence of progress in educational attainment.51 
The clear positive correlation between women’s educational attainment and health status and economic growth 
in Arab countries provides further evidence to the particular importance of strengthening human capital.52  
Investments in human capital, particularly in education, hence seem to be a “double winner”: they push the 
demographic transition, and are a crucial prerequisite to realize the potential of the demographic dividend. In 
addition, the demographic dividend can be sustained even as support ratios begin to decline, which is usually 
an indicator for the end of the demographic window of opportunity. When younger, better-educated workers 
replace older, less educated ones; this translates into increases in productivity that can at least partly 
compensate for the negative demographic dynamics. 
                                                                
51 Crespo Cuaresma, Lutz and Sanderson, 2014. 
52 Torabi and Abbasi-Shavazi, 2015. 
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One of the crucial prerequisites to reap the benefits of the first demographic dividend is good health. 
Unfortunately, the prevalence of diabetes and other non-communicable diseases has been increasing in many 
Arab countries among the adult population, in some instances to higher levels than those observed in developed 
countries. Poor health is not only a serious problem for individuals, but also for countries. It lowers labour 
force participation, might cause earlier withdrawal from the labour market and lower productivity, and creates 
heavy costs for the health-care system. Government spending could have to be diverted for health-related 
expenditure, affecting the level of human capital that could potentially be achieved.  
One important final aspect is that the first and the second demographic dividend do not happen consecutively; 
they overlap. The second dividend begins towards the end of the intermediate phase of the demographic 
transition and extends through the late phase, but the policies for realizing the second dividend are best 
established during the intermediate phase.53 Although Arab countries might be mainly concerned with reaping 
the benefits of the first dividend, policymakers would be well advised to create conditions for people to 
accumulate wealth for old age, for example by making sure that sound and accessible financial systems exist. 
The sooner people have the chance to prepare financially for old age, the larger the benefits of the second 
demographic dividend. In order for people to save for their own old age, there must be safe and accessible 
ways to accumulate assets over decades. Otherwise, individuals might decide not to take risks by saving. 
  
                                                                
53 Mason and Lee, 2006. 
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Annex 
Figure 1A. Population pyramids of Arab countries, 1980, 2015, 2050 (medium fertility variant)  
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Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 
2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 1A. Total population, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050, medium variant (thousands) 
Country/subregion 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Comoros 309 358 415 480 548 619 699 788 883 981 1081 1184 1290 1397 1502 
Djibouti 359 423 588 661 723 778 831 888 947 1003 1054 1097 1133 1163 1186 
Mauritania 1534 1767 2024 2334 2711 3154 3591 4068 4573 5107 5666 6248 6844 7446 8049 
Somalia 6090 6068 6322 6346 7385 8467 9582 10787 12423 14344 16493 18844 21388 24119 27030 
Sudan 14418 17098 20009 24692 28080 31990 36115 40235 45308 50740 56443 62331 68311 74307 80284 
Yemen 8059 9774 11961 15266 17795 20504 23592 26832 30030 33181 36335 39361 42211 44839 47170 
Total Arab LDCs 30769 35488 41319 49779 57242 65512 74409 83598 94164 105356 117073 129065 141176 153271 165222 
Bahrain 360 419 496 564 667 867 1261 1377 1486 1571 1642 1705 1759 1797 1822 
Kuwait 1384 1735 2059 1637 1929 2264 3059 3892 4317 4672 4987 5252 5499 5725 5924 
Oman 1154 1498 1812 2192 2239 2507 2944 4491 4816 5058 5238 5376 5507 5659 5844 
Qatar 224 371 476 501 593 837 1766 2235 2452 2640 2781 2902 3013 3115 3205 
Saudi Arabia 9913 13361 16361 18854 21392 24745 28091 31540 34366 36847 39132 41235 43136 44763 46059 
United Arab Emirate 1017 1350 1811 2350 3050 4482 8329 9157 9822 10434 10977 11500 11995 12430 12789 
Total GCC countries 14052 18736 23016 26098 29872 35702 45450 52693 57259 61222 64758 67971 70909 73488 75643 
Egypt 43370 49374 56397 62435 68335 74942 82041 91508 100518 108939 117102 125589 134428 143064 151111 
Iraq 13653 15576 17478 20218 23575 27018 30868 36423 41972 47797 54071 60873 68127 75758 83652 
Jordan 2281 2783 3358 4320 4767 5333 6518 7595 8167 8547 9109 9808 10492 11137 11717 
Lebanon 2605 2677 2703 3033 3235 3987 4337 5851 5891 5408 5292 5429 5517 5573 5610 
State of Palestine 1509 1759 2101 2618 3224 3579 4069 4668 5333 6040 6765 7504 8259 9025 9791 
Syrian Arab Republic 8956 10667 12452 14332 16354 18133 20721 18502 20994 25559 28647 30424 32070 33571 34902 
Total Mashreq 72375 82836 94490 106956 119490 132992 148554 164548 182875 202291 220986 239627 258894 278128 296783 
Algeria 19338 22566 25912 28904 31184 33268 36036 39667 43008 45865 48274 50424 52496 54546 56461 
Libya 3191 3841 4398 4878 5337 5802 6266 6278 6700 7086 7418 7713 7980 8207 8375 
Morocco 20072 22596 24950 27162 28951 30385 32108 34378 36444 38255 39787 41073 42148 43027 43696 
Tunisia 6368 7322 8233 9114 9699 10102 10639 11254 11835 12320 12686 12955 13166 13342 13476 
Total Maghreb 48969 56325 63494 70058 75171 79557 85049 91576 97987 103526 108165 112165 115790 119122 122008 
Total Arab region 166164 193385 222319 252891 281775 313763 353462 392414 432286 472394 510981 548828 586769 624008 659656 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 2A. Total population, Arab countries and subregions, 2015, 2030 and 2050 (thousands) 
Country/subregion 
 Medium fertility 
variant 
Medium fertility 
variant 
Low fertility 
variant 
Low fertility 
variant 
High fertility 
variant 
High fertility 
variant 
 2015 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 
Comoros 788 1081 1502 1042 1351 1121 1660 
Djibouti 888 1054 1186 1012 1059 1096 1318 
Mauritania 4068 5666 8049 15963 24622 17023 29534 
Somalia 10787 16493 27030 54357 72262 58529 88653 
Sudan 40235 56443 80284 5470 7287 5863 8843 
Yemen 26832 36335 47170 34895 42025 37775 52567 
Total Arab LDCs 83598 117073 165222 112739 148604 121406 182575 
Bahrain 1377 1642 1822 1588 1661 1695 1991 
Kuwait 3892 4987 5924 4786 5325 5188 6555 
Oman 4491 5238 5844 5059 5297 5417 6413 
Qatar 2235 2781 3205 2699 2953 2864 3471 
Saudi Arabia 31540 39132 46059 37706 41499 40558 50773 
United Arab Emirates 9157 10977 12789 10664 11778 11290 13879 
Total GCC countries 52693 64758 75643 62502 68513 67013 83081 
Egypt 91508 117102 151111 112588 134498 121616 168768 
Iraq 36423 54071 83652 52092 75210 56049 92540 
Jordan 7595 9109 11717 8744 10478 9474 13010 
Lebanon 5851 5292 5610 5021 4964 5562 6298 
State of Palestine 4668 6765 9791 6502 8785 7027 10845 
Syrian Arab Republic 18502 28647 34902 27550 31102 29745 38881 
Total Mashreq 164548 220986 296783 212497 265036 229474 330343 
Algeria 39667 48274 56461 46407 50631 50142 62541 
Libya 6278 7418 8375 7123 7473 7713 9309 
Morocco 34378 39787 43696 38190 38894 41384 48760 
Tunisia 11254 12686 13476 12179 12040 13193 14978 
Total Maghreb 91576 108165 122008 103899 109038 112431 135587 
Total Arab region 392414 510981 659656 491638 591192 530324 731585 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 3A. Total fertility rate, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 7.1 6.7 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 
Djibouti 6.3 6.2 5.9 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 
Mauritania 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 
Somalia 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.1 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.8 
Sudan 6.6 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.3 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 
Yemen 8.8 8.8 8.2 6.8 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 
Total Arab LDCs 7.3 7.1 6.8 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.8 
Bahrain 4.6 4.1 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Kuwait 5.0 3.2 2.4 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Oman 8.3 7.8 6.3 4.5 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 
Qatar 5.5 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Saudi Arabia 7.0 6.2 5.6 4.5 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 
United Arab Emirates 5.2 4.8 3.9 3.0 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Total GCC countries 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.2 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Egypt 5.5 5.2 4.1 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Iraq 6.4 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.2 
Jordan 7.0 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 
Lebanon 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
State of Palestine 7.0 6.8 6.6 5.8 5.0 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 
Syrian Arab Republic 6.8 5.9 4.8 4.3 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Total Mashreq 5.8 5.4 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 
Algeria 6.3 5.3 4.1 2.9 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 
Libya 6.7 5.7 4.2 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Morocco 5.4 4.4 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Tunisia 4.8 4.0 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Total Maghreb 5.8 4.8 3.8 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Total Arab region 6.1 5.5 4.8 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 4A. Crude birth rate, Arab countries, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 46.9 44.5 40.7 38.4 37.1 36.0 34.6 32.2 29.8 27.8 26.3 24.9 23.6 22.3 
Djibouti 39.7 40.1 38.9 32.9 30.0 27.6 25.7 23.7 21.9 20.1 18.4 17.1 16.2 15.4 
Mauritania 46.1 47.5 49.2 49.7 47.4 46.2 43.9 42.9 41.2 39.1 36.8 34.5 32.5 30.7 
Somalia 44.2 42.1 41.6 40.3 38.9 36.1 33.7 31.7 30.0 28.3 26.7 25.1 23.6 22.3 
Sudan 42.2 41.2 40.1 38.8 37.6 36.0 34.0 32.0 30.4 28.9 27.5 26.2 24.9 23.7 
Yemen 54.7 53.4 49.8 41.6 37.9 35.9 33.2 30.6 27.6 25.0 22.8 20.8 19.1 17.5 
Bahrain 33.0 31.4 26.7 22.5 20.0 17.0 15.4 13.1 11.5 10.6 10.1 9.7 9.3 8.9 
Kuwait 36.3 25.3 19.9 24.5 21.3 23.2 20.7 18.4 15.6 13.5 12.5 12.3 12.3 12.2 
Oman 48.2 42.9 33.4 26.9 22.4 21.4 20.8 17.5 14.7 12.1 10.7 10.8 11.3 11.3 
Qatar 33.3 24.9 21.4 20.2 18.3 13.0 12.1 11.5 10.6 9.6 8.9 8.5 8.4 8.4 
Saudi Arabia 42.5 37.9 33.1 28.5 24.4 22.6 20.8 18.5 16.7 15.4 14.6 14.0 13.3 12.5 
United Arab Emirates 30.2 28.3 22.8 18.0 15.1 12.6 11.2 10.0 8.9 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.3 8.0 
Egypt 39.0 36.6 29.8 25.5 25.2 25.2 28.5 25.1 22.3 20.6 20.3 20.1 19.1 17.7 
Iraq 39.0 38.3 37.1 36.6 34.9 35.5 35.1 33.2 31.1 29.6 28.4 27.3 26.1 24.9 
Jordan 39.7 35.3 34.0 32.3 30.2 28.7 27.9 24.9 22.4 20.6 19.5 18.5 17.4 16.1 
Lebanon 28.8 25.9 23.3 20.6 16.3 12.7 15.0 15.4 15.1 13.6 11.6 10.1 9.5 9.6 
State of Palestine 44.9 45.1 45.7 40.8 35.9 34.0 33.1 31.4 29.2 26.9 25.0 23.5 22.2 20.9 
Syrian Arab Republic 42.8 38.4 33.5 32.0 28.8 26.3 24.1 21.2 20.7 19.3 17.8 16.6 15.6 14.7 
Algeria 40.8 35.2 28.8 21.6 19.2 23.1 25.1 21.5 18.2 15.7 14.5 14.2 14.3 14.0 
Libya 37.0 32.4 25.4 22.4 21.9 22.9 21.7 18.7 16.2 14.6 13.8 13.6 13.2 12.5 
Morocco 36.7 31.4 27.5 23.2 20.6 20.8 21.3 19.1 17.1 15.4 14.3 13.6 13.1 12.6 
Tunisia 33.1 29.0 22.9 18.7 16.6 17.0 18.4 17.0 15.0 13.2 12.1 11.9 12.0 12.0 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: The crude birth rate is calculated as the average number of births per 1,000 population over a given period. 
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Table 5A. Crude death rate, Arab countries, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country 
1980-
1885 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 14.6 12.4 10.6 9.6 9.3 8.6 7.7 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 
Djibouti 11.8 10.5 10.8 10.4 10.2 9.6 8.7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.9 
Mauritania 19.4 19.0 20.2 16.5 15.0 13.7 12.4 11.3 10.3 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.2 6.7 
Somalia 12.9 12.3 11.7 11.0 10.0 8.9 7.9 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.7 
Sudan 12.0 10.9 10.3 9.7 9.4 8.9 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.6 
Yemen 15.1 12.3 11.1 9.8 8.6 7.8 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.9 
Bahrain 4.1 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.3 4.0 4.9 5.9 7.0 
Kuwait 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.9 6.9 
Oman 8.6 6.4 4.8 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.2 4.8 5.6 
Qatar 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.8 4.6 
Saudi Arabia 7.2 5.5 4.5 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.4 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.6 
United Arab Emirates 3.5 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.3 5.3 6.3 
Egypt 11.4 9.3 7.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.3 6.5 
Iraq 9.9 7.6 6.4 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.0 
Jordan 6.5 5.5 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.7 
Lebanon 7.2 7.0 6.6 5.9 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.7 6.2 6.8 7.6 
State of Palestine 6.8 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.1 
Syrian Arab Republic 6.2 5.0 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.5 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.8 6.2 6.6 
Algeria 9.2 6.8 6.1 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.9 
Libya 6.5 5.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.6 7.3 8.1 9.0 
Morocco 10.0 8.1 6.9 6.5 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.4 7.0 7.6 8.1 
Tunisia 7.8 6.9 5.8 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.6 8.3 9.1 9.7 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: The crude death rate is calculated as the average number of deaths per 1,000 population over a given period.  
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Table 6A. Life expectancy at birth, men, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country/subregion 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 50.7 53.7 56.3 57.8 58.0 59.3 61.2 62.5 63.7 64.8 65.7 66.6 67.5 68.3 
Djibouti 53.2 54.6 55.4 55.4 55.9 57.6 60.0 61.1 62.1 63.0 63.8 64.7 65.4 66.1 
Mauritania 54.4 56.5 57.5 58.3 58.6 59.7 61.3 62.1 62.7 63.3 63.9 64.4 65.0 65.5 
Somalia 44.0 44.9 43.5 48.3 50.0 51.7 53.3 54.9 56.5 58.1 59.6 61.0 62.2 63.4 
Sudan 53.0 53.7 54.5 55.5 57.0 59.2 61.6 62.6 63.7 64.6 65.5 66.4 67.2 67.9 
Yemen 51.5 55.2 57.1 58.5 59.7 60.8 62.2 63.1 63.9 64.7 65.4 66.1 66.7 67.3 
Total Arab LDCs 51.0 52.9 53.9 55.6 57.0 58.7 60.7 61.7 62.7 63.7 64.5 65.4 66.2 66.9 
Bahrain 69.4 70.8 72.0 73.2 74.2 74.9 75.6 76.2 76.9 77.6 78.3 79.1 79.8 80.6 
Kuwait 69.4 70.9 71.7 72.2 72.6 72.9 73.3 73.8 74.2 74.7 75.3 75.8 76.4 77.0 
Oman 60.2 63.9 66.7 69.2 71.4 73.2 74.7 76.0 77.2 78.5 79.7 80.9 82.1 83.2 
Qatar 72.5 73.7 74.5 75.1 75.6 76.0 77.1 77.9 78.8 79.6 80.5 81.4 82.3 83.2 
Saudi Arabia 63.3 66.4 68.3 70.1 71.6 72.1 72.8 73.5 74.2 74.9 75.6 76.3 77.0 77.7 
United Arab Emirates 67.6 69.7 71.3 72.7 74.0 75.2 76.0 76.9 77.8 78.7 79.6 80.6 81.6 82.5 
Total GCC countries 64.4 67.2 68.9 70.6 72.1 73.0 74.0 74.8 75.5 76.3 77.0 77.8 78.6 79.4 
Egypt 57.7 61.2 63.1 65.6 66.7 67.6 68.7 69.6 70.4 71.2 72.1 72.8 73.7 74.6 
Iraq 53.0 60.9 64.3 66.5 66.9 65.1 67.0 67.7 68.4 69.1 69.6 70.3 70.9 71.5 
Jordan 65.9 67.9 69.1 70.0 70.8 71.5 72.2 72.9 73.6 74.3 75.1 75.9 76.6 77.4 
Lebanon 66.7 67.9 69.6 71.7 73.9 76.0 77.1 78.6 80.1 81.6 82.9 83.9 84.8 85.6 
State of Palestine 62.8 65.5 67.3 68.7 69.5 69.9 70.7 71.5 72.2 73.0 73.8 74.5 75.4 76.2 
Syrian Arab Republic 66.3 68.4 69.5 70.3 70.9 72.0 64.0 65.2 66.4 67.5 68.7 69.9 71.0 72.1 
Total Mashreq 58.6 62.6 64.7 66.8 67.7 68.2 68.2 69.2 70.0 70.7 71.5 72.2 73.0 73.8 
Algeria 60.1 64.4 65.6 67.7 69.2 71.0 72.1 73.4 74.5 75.7 76.7 77.8 78.9 79.9 
Libya 63.9 65.9 67.8 68.7 69.1 69.5 68.8 69.5 70.3 71.0 71.8 72.6 73.4 74.2 
Morocco 58.1 61.7 64.3 66.0 68.0 70.2 72.6 73.8 74.8 75.8 76.8 77.7 78.6 79.5 
Tunisia 62.8 65.4 68.1 70.1 71.4 72.3 72.3 73.2 74.1 74.9 75.8 76.6 77.4 78.2 
Total Maghreb 59.9 63.6 65.6 67.4 69.0 70.8 72.1 73.2 74.3 75.3 76.3 77.3 78.2 79.2 
Total Arab region 58.2 61.6 63.4 65.2 66.4 67.6 68.5 69.4 70.2 70.9 71.7 72.4 73.1 73.8 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: Averages are population weighted. 
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Table 7A. Life expectancy at birth, women, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country/subregion 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 53.9 56.9 59.4 60.9 61.2 62.5 64.5 66.0 67.3 68.5 69.6 70.6 71.7 72.6 
Djibouti 56.2 57.7 58.7 58.7 58.8 60.5 63.2 64.4 65.6 66.6 67.6 68.5 69.5 70.4 
Mauritania 57.1 59.0 60.2 61.4 61.9 62.9 64.3 65.2 66.0 66.8 67.4 68.1 68.8 69.5 
Somalia 47.1 48.0 46.5 51.4 53.1 54.8 56.5 58.2 59.9 61.5 63.1 64.6 66.0 67.3 
Sudan 56.0 56.6 57.6 59.0 60.8 62.7 64.6 65.8 67.1 68.2 69.3 70.3 71.2 72.1 
Yemen 54.5 58.2 60.0 61.3 62.4 63.4 64.9 65.9 66.9 67.9 68.7 69.5 70.3 71.1 
Total Arab LDCs 54.0 55.8 56.9 58.9 60.3 61.8 63.6 64.8 66.0 67.1 68.1 69.1 70.0 70.9 
Bahrain 72.1 73.2 74.1 75.1 75.9 76.7 77.4 78.1 78.8 79.5 80.1 80.7 81.3 81.9 
Kuwait 71.7 72.9 73.6 74.1 74.5 74.9 75.6 76.2 76.9 77.5 78.1 78.7 79.2 79.8 
Oman 63.7 67.6 70.7 73.3 75.5 77.5 78.9 79.9 80.9 81.8 82.5 83.3 84.0 84.6 
Qatar 74.5 75.7 76.6 77.4 78.1 78.7 79.7 80.4 81.1 81.8 82.4 83.1 83.7 84.2 
Saudi Arabia 66.8 69.6 72.1 73.8 74.4 74.7 75.5 76.3 77.1 77.8 78.4 79.0 79.6 80.2 
United Arab Emirates 70.6 72.3 73.6 74.9 76.3 77.3 78.2 79.1 79.9 80.6 81.4 82.1 82.8 83.4 
Total GCC countries 67.4 70.1 72.3 73.9 74.8 75.3 76.2 77.1 77.9 78.6 79.2 79.9 80.5 81.1 
Egypt 62.2 65.9 67.9 70.4 71.4 72.2 73.1 74.1 75.1 75.9 76.7 77.5 78.3 79.0 
Iraq 66.3 68.4 70.6 71.9 71.0 71.2 71.4 72.3 73.2 73.9 74.6 75.3 76.0 76.6 
Jordan 68.8 70.6 71.9 72.8 73.8 74.6 75.5 76.3 77.1 77.9 78.6 79.3 79.9 80.5 
Lebanon 70.1 71.3 72.5 74.8 77.4 79.7 80.9 82.1 83.3 84.3 85.3 86.1 86.9 87.6 
State of Palestine 66.1 68.7 70.4 71.9 72.9 73.8 74.7 75.6 76.5 77.2 78.0 78.7 79.4 80.1 
Syrian Arab Republic 68.0 70.3 72.1 74.0 75.7 77.3 76.3 77.2 78.0 78.8 79.6 80.3 81.0 81.6 
Total Mashreq 64.3 67.3 69.3 71.4 72.2 73.1 73.5 74.5 75.3 76.1 76.9 77.6 78.3 78.9 
Algeria 63.0 67.3 68.8 70.6 73.3 75.2 76.8 78.0 79.0 79.9 80.8 81.5 82.2 82.9 
Libya 67.5 69.4 71.2 72.0 72.8 74.4 74.4 75.2 76.0 76.7 77.4 78.0 78.7 79.3 
Morocco 61.1 64.7 67.7 69.3 71.0 72.7 74.6 76.0 77.2 78.2 79.1 80.0 80.7 81.5 
Tunisia 65.9 69.1 72.7 75.0 76.3 77.0 77.0 77.9 78.6 79.2 79.9 80.4 81.0 81.5 
Total Maghreb 62.9 66.6 69.0 70.8 72.7 74.4 75.9 77.0 78.1 79.0 79.8 80.6 81.3 82.0 
Total Arab region 62.2 65.2 67.1 68.9 70.1 71.2 72.2 73.2 74.1 74.9 75.7 76.4 77.1 77.7 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: Averages are population weighted. 
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Table 8A. Infant mortality rates, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country/subregion 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 109.1 93.5 81.0 74.1 72.6 66.7 58.1 52.2 47.1 42.2 38.0 34.2 30.7 27.6 
Djibouti 87.4 81.3 76.1 71.8 68.1 63.4 55.3 50.4 46.3 42.6 39.3 36.0 32.8 29.8 
Mauritania 89.2 82.7 79.7 76.1 75.6 72.7 67.3 62.5 58.1 54.1 50.7 47.4 43.7 40.5 
Somalia 127.8 123.3 129.6 105.2 97.0 89.8 79.5 69.9 64.4 58.5 53.2 48.1 43.8 39.7 
Sudan 87.0 84.1 80.0 73.8 66.8 59.7 53.3 48.4 44.0 40.0 35.8 31.9 28.8 26.0 
Yemen 117.0 95.4 84.0 75.4 68.0 61.3 53.6 48.6 44.3 40.4 36.3 32.8 29.6 26.7 
Total Arab LDCs (mean) 102.9 93.4 88.4 79.4 74.7 68.9 61.2 55.3 50.7 46.3 42.2 38.4 34.9 31.7 
Bahrain 23.1 18.5 14.9 12.0 9.8 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.3 
Kuwait 23.9 16.3 12.7 10.9 10.2 9.7 8.6 7.6 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.1 
Oman 59.4 42.1 30.9 21.7 14.6 9.8 7.3 5.9 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.2 
Qatar 23.2 18.4 14.7 11.8 9.4 7.5 6.5 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 
Saudi Arabia 56.2 41.1 30.4 23.1 18.8 16.2 15.3 13.2 11.4 9.9 8.9 7.9 7.1 6.5 
United Arab Emirates 29.6 21.7 16.5 12.4 9.2 6.9 6.2 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 
Total GCC countries (mean) 35.9 26.4 20.0 15.3 12.0 9.7 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.8 
Egypt 106.9 74.3 59.6 36.7 29.4 23.5 18.9 15.6 13.2 11.6 10.2 9.1 8.1 7.4 
Iraq 43.3 38.1 36.6 36.2 34.7 33.3 32.1 27.9 24.4 21.2 18.7 16.8 15.1 13.6 
Jordan 42.7 34.0 29.1 25.6 22.4 19.7 17.1 14.8 12.7 11.0 9.7 8.5 7.6 6.8 
Lebanon 35.0 30.4 25.1 18.8 13.8 10.6 9.3 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.9 
State of Palestine 51.4 40.1 33.1 27.9 25.0 23.1 20.6 18.5 16.6 15.0 13.6 12.4 11.3 10.3 
Syrian Arab Republic 42.9 33.5 26.3 21.3 17.8 14.9 17.9 14.9 12.4 10.3 8.5 7.1 6.2 5.5 
Total Mashreq (mean) 53.7 41.7 34.9 27.7 23.8 20.8 19.3 16.6 14.4 12.5 11.0 9.8 8.8 7.9 
Algeria 75.4 55.4 47.7 41.9 37.5 34.2 30.3 25.4 20.5 17.2 14.6 12.4 10.7 9.1 
Libya 51.0 41.2 32.9 29.6 27.2 24.3 24.3 20.8 18.3 16.2 14.2 12.6 11.1 9.9 
Morocco 83.9 66.6 53.0 44.1 37.9 31.8 26.3 20.8 16.4 13.7 11.5 9.8 8.6 7.8 
Tunisia 65.8 48.8 35.2 28.6 23.0 18.7 18.7 16.5 14.1 12.3 10.8 9.9 9.1 8.5 
Total Maghreb (mean) 69.0 53.0 42.2 36.1 31.4 27.2 24.9 20.9 17.4 14.8 12.8 11.2 9.9 8.8 
Total Arab region (mean) 65.1 53.7 46.8 39.9 35.9 32.1 28.8 25.4 22.6 20.3 18.2 16.4 14.8 13.4 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: The infant mortality rate is calculated as the number of deaths per 1,000 births over a given period. 
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Table 9A. Child mortality rates, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country/subregion 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros 158.3 133.5 113.8 102.9 100.6 91.4 77.9 68.6 60.6 53.3 47.2 42.0 37.2 33.2 
Djibouti 140.5 129.5 120.0 112.0 105.5 97.5 83.4 76.1 69.9 64.3 59.2 54.0 49.0 44.4 
Mauritania 146.7 130.2 122.5 113.3 112.1 104.4 90.1 83.8 78.0 72.9 68.4 64.1 59.1 54.8 
Somalia 219.2 210.7 221.9 176.3 160.7 147.0 131.2 116.4 105.1 94.3 84.4 74.9 66.6 58.7 
Sudan 142.5 137.2 129.7 118.6 106.1 93.3 81.5 74.0 66.4 59.4 52.3 45.9 40.7 36.0 
Yemen 171.8 137.0 118.9 105.3 93.7 83.2 72.8 66.1 60.2 54.6 49.0 44.1 39.7 35.6 
Total Arab LDCs (mean) 152.5 135.2 121.2 112.7 105.8 95.4 82.5 75.0 68.1 61.8 55.7 49.9 44.8 40.2 
Bahrain 26.7 21.1 18.6 13.9 11.8 10.6 9.3 8.1 7.1 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.7 4.4 
Kuwait 30.0 20.8 16.5 14.3 13.3 12.5 11.2 9.8 8.7 7.8 7.1 6.4 5.8 5.3 
Oman 84.3 57.2 40.2 27.1 17.9 11.8 8.9 7.2 6.3 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.0 
Qatar 31.1 23.8 18.5 14.5 11.5 9.2 7.9 6.9 6.2 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.0 
Saudi Arabia 77.2 54.4 38.7 28.3 21.6 18.0 16.8 14.5 12.6 11.0 9.9 8.8 7.9 7.2 
United Arab Emirates 36.1 25.7 19.3 14.4 10.7 8.1 7.2 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 
Total GCC countries (mean) 33.6 24.8 18.9 14.5 12.6 11.2 9.1 7.7 6.7 6.0 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 
Egypt 149.0 102.2 80.4 48.7 38.3 30.0 24.2 19.9 16.9 14.8 13.0 11.5 10.3 9.3 
Iraq 59.2 51.5 48.2 46.4 41.3 38.8 37.5 32.6 28.5 25.0 22.0 19.8 17.8 16.1 
Jordan 51.9 40.2 34.2 30.0 26.2 22.8 19.8 17.2 14.8 12.9 11.3 10.0 8.9 8.0 
Lebanon 43.0 36.9 30.0 22.1 16.0 12.3 10.8 9.3 8.0 7.0 6.2 5.5 5.0 4.5 
State of Palestine 67.4 50.3 40.5 33.5 29.8 27.3 24.3 21.6 19.4 17.5 15.8 14.3 13.1 12.0 
Syrian Arab Republic 55.0 41.5 31.7 25.2 20.9 17.4 20.9 17.5 14.6 12.2 10.1 8.4 7.4 6.5 
Total Mashreq (mean) 57.1 45.9 37.4 31.8 28.0 25.1 22.5 18.7 15.9 13.8 12.2 10.8 9.6 8.7 
Algeria 103.5 71.5 60.2 52.3 45.9 41.3 36.0 30.3 24.6 20.5 17.4 14.8 12.7 10.8 
Libya 63.0 49.9 39.2 35.1 32.1 28.7 28.8 24.7 21.8 19.3 17.0 15.0 13.3 11.8 
Morocco 118.1 89.4 68.2 55.2 47.2 39.1 31.7 25.2 20.0 16.6 13.9 11.8 10.5 9.5 
Tunisia 76.8 57.0 40.5 33.0 25.6 20.4 20.4 18.1 15.6 13.6 12.0 11.1 10.3 9.6 
Total Maghreb (mean) 90.1 64.2 50.4 43.7 39.0 33.9 30.2 25.0 20.9 18.0 15.5 13.3 11.6 10.2 
Total Arab region (mean) 77.0 55.7 40.5 34.3 30.9 28.0 24.2 20.8 18.1 15.7 13.5 11.7 10.4 9.6 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: The child mortality rate is calculated as the number of deaths of children aged 0-5 years old per 1,000 births over a period of time. 
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Table 10A. Average annual rate of change of the percentage rural, Arab countries, 1980-2050 (percentage)  
Country 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros -0.6 -0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
Djibouti -2.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 
Somalia -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 
Sudan -0.8 -1.5 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 
Mauritania -2.2 -2.0 -1.4 -1.5 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 
Yemen -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 
Bahrain -1.6 -1.6 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Kuwait -18.2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Oman -4.0 -4.7 -3.6 0.1 -0.6 -2.1 -2.1 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 
Qatar -1.4 -6.3 -7.3 -6.1 -7.4 -12.8 -11.5 -9.3 -7.0 -4.7 -2.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Saudi Arabia -4.4 -3.1 -1.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
United Arab Emirates 0.9 0.7 0.7 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1 -2.0 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
Egypt 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 
Iraq -2.0 -0.6 0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Jordan -3.8 -4.2 -4.2 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
Lebanon -4.9 -4.0 -2.1 -1.6 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
State of Palestine -1.5 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Syrian Arab Republic -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Algeria -1.6 -1.6 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 -2.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Libya -3.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Morocco -1.3 -1.4 -1.3 -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Tunisia -1.4 -1.9 -1.8 -1.0 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision database. Available from https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup. Accessed 30 September 
2015. 
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Table 11A. Net number of migrants, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (thousands, medium fertility variant) 
Country/subregion 1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
2045-
2050 
Comoros -5 -5 -3 -6 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
Djibouti 10 90 -15 -17 -18 -20 -16 -11 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 
Somalia -832 -632 -893 -100 -200 -350 -400 -200 -150 -150 -150 -150 -150 -150 
Sudan 220 150 1350 -490 -430 -500 -800 -100 -45 -45 -45 -45 -45 -45 
Mauritania -16 -30 -15 10 30 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 
Yemen -50 -50 673 -100 -100 0 -50 -200 -200 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 
Total Arab LDCs -673 -477 1097 -703 -728 -900 -1296 -541 -434 -334 -334 -334 -334 -334 
Bahrain 3 13 5 43 134 317 30 33 18 13 13 13 8 8 
Kuwait 96 111 -581 99 139 522 518 100 70 70 50 50 45 45 
Oman 82 11 94 -208 40 186 1211 -20 -50 -50 -50 -50 -30 20 
Qatar 102 58 -22 43 185 855 364 100 75 40 30 30 30 30 
Saudi Arabia 1392 591 -25 60 945 815 850 350 200 200 200 200 200 200 
United Arab Emirates 176 261 327 484 1180 3493 405 275 275 250 250 250 250 250 
Total GGC countries 1850 1044 -202 521 2623 6187 3 377 838 588 523 493 493 503 553 
Egypt -390 -205 -453 -204 -68 -279 -216 -216 -216 -216 -216 -216 -216 -216 
Iraq -200 -630 -154 -18 -266 -457 549 20 -104 -85 -30 -30 -30 -30 
Jordan 82 118 401 -188 -94 450 230 -258 -394 -172 -20 -20 -20 -20 
Lebanon -214 -228 90 -29 550 183 1250 -279 -770 -335 -20 -20 -20 -20 
State of Palestine -61 -39 35 70 -190 -90 -44 -33 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 -25 
Syrian Arab Republic -87 -147 -70 -130 -380 370 -4030 941 2780 1201 -33 -41 -50 -50 
Total Mashreq -871 -1131 -150 -500 -448 177 -2261 175 1271 368 -344 -352 -361 -361 
Algeria -81 -93 -129 -164 -205 -357 -143 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 
Libya 113 5 4 9 -12 -82 -502 -10 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Morocco -321 -419 -467 -559 -695 -578 -311 -311 -300 -300 -300 -300 -300 -300 
Tunisia 86 49 140 -37 -139 -33 -33 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 
Total Maghreb -203 -457 -451 -752 -1051 -1050 -989 -391 -350 -350 -350 -350 -350 -350 
Total Arab region 104 -1022 293 -1433 397 4414 -1169 81 1 075 207 -535 -543 -542 -492 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 12A. Net migration rate, Arab countries and subregions, 1980-2050 (medium fertility variant) 
Country 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
2025-
2030 
2030-
2035 
2035-
2040 
2040-
2045 
Comoros -2.7 -2.3 -1.3 -2.3 -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.1 -1.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 
Djibouti 5.1 35.6 -4.8 -4.8 -4.8 -5.0 -3.7 -2.4 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 
Somalia -27.4 -20.4 -28.2 -2.9 -5.0 -7.8 -7.9 -3.4 -2.2 -1.9 -1.7 -1.5 -1.3 
Sudan 2.8 1.6 12.1 -3.7 -2.9 -2.9 -4.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Mauritania -2.0 -3.2 -1.3 0.8 2.0 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
Yemen -1.1 -0.9 9.9 -1.2 -1.0 0 -0.4 -1.4 -1.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
Total Arab LDCs -4.1 -2.5 4.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.6 -3.3 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
Bahrain 1.6 5.6 2.1 14.0 34.8 59.5 4.5 4.6 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 0.9 
Kuwait 12.3 11.7 -62.9 11.0 13.3 39.2 29.8 4.9 3.1 2.9 2.0 1.9 1.6 
Oman 12.3 1.3 9.4 -18.8 3.4 13.6 65.2 -0.9 -2.0 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.1 
Qatar 68.7 27.1 -9.2 15.7 51.8 131.4 36.3 8.5 5.9 3.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 
Saudi Arabia 23.9 8.0 -0.3 0.6 8.2 6.2 5.7 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 
United Arab Emirates 29.7 33.0 31.4 35.9 62.7 109.1 9.3 5.8 5.4 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.1 
Total GCC countries 22.6 10.0 -1.6 3.8 15.9 30.5 13.7 3.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Egypt -1.7 -0.8 -1.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
Iraq -2.7 -7.6 -1.6 -0.2 -2.1 -3.2 3.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Jordan 6.5 7.7 20.9 -8.3 -3.7 15.2 6.5 -6.6 -9.4 -3.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
Lebanon -16.2 -17.0 6.3 -1.9 30.5 8.8 49.1 -9.5 -27.3 -12.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
State of Palestine -7.5 -4.1 3.0 4.8 -11.2 -4.7 -2.0 -1.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
Syrian Arab Republic -1.8 -2.5 -1.0 -1.7 -4.4 3.8 -41.1 9.5 23.9 8.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 
Total Mashreq -2.2 -2.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.7 0.3 -3.7 0.5 2.0 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Algeria -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.3 -2.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Libya 6.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.4 -2.7 -16.0 -0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Morocco -3.0 -3.5 -3.6 -4.0 -4.7 -3.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 
Tunisia 2.5 1.3 3.2 -0.8 -2.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Total Maghreb -0.8 -1.5 -1.3 -2.1 -2.7 -2.5 -2.2 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
Total 0.1 -1.0 0.2 -1.1 0.2 2.6 -1.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
Note: The net migration rate is calculated as the average net number of migrants per 1,000 population over a period of time. 
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Table 13A. Number of asylum-seekers and refugees from Arab countries, 2000-2014  
Type 
Country/subregion of 
origin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
A
s
y
l
u
m
-
s
e
e
k
e
r
 
A
r
a
b
 
L
D
C
s
 
Comoros 94 80 37 48 521 516 11 43 40 13 13 33 49 327 337 
Djibouti 147 182 115 71 40 218 113 32 66 162 232 287 312 406 416 
Mauritania 1788 2568 2979 2883 2586 2304 1811 1017 784 911 764 592 3042 3860 6969 
Somalia 11979 16197 13960 14790 20529 30468 22021 16436 20543 21084 22839 31255 33690 35657 49051 
Sudan 19112 19827 14016 6694 11969 13478 16654 19417 18080 16922 23713 31465 21548 28388 36001 
Yemen 856 743 640 479 338 419 359 320 473 620 627 1162 1592 1882 2692 
G
C
C
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
Bahrain 55 9 14 12 22 27 20 18 13 4 26 76 110 91 95 
Kuwait 101 144 118 109 95 73 125 109 68 67 97 165 140 190 240 
Oman 10 5 10 8 8 8 8 4 4 8 8 4 5 5 9 
Qatar 30 31 31 18 4 7 6 2 3 5 7 7 6 5 0 
Saudi Arabia 52 153 111 103 87 71 54 44 39 57 80 112 149 212 352 
United Arab Emirates 10 31 38 25 11 16 12 10 11 26 29 14 24 46 68 
M
a
s
h
r
e
q
 
Egypt 1154 1445 1834 2025 2252 2329 1695 1632 1828 1638 1588 2626 4130 9487 10787 
Iraq 40652 34848 29655 31615 30638 34443 47318 27693 25675 22383 29956 24502 24257 43144 103702 
Jordan 559 566 733 729 722 670 774 743 759 772 622 534 635 944 1272 
Lebanon 1541 1891 2371 2129 1611 2003 3159 2576 2291 1772 1521 1399 1984 2741 3776 
State of Palestine 545 892 1012 1086 1032 1066 1387 2420 2661 2501 3209 1780 2438 3348 3607 
Syrian Arab Republic 7464 7728 8550 7104 7588 14008 15026 13736 11978 11140 19528 28912 52046 82074 159254 
M
a
g
h
r
e
b
 
Algeria 2330 2751 2380 1922 1348 1391 1544 1356 1536 1546 1713 2187 2463 4295 5097 
Libya 542 484 929 904 820 769 671 623 765 641 566 1963 1907 2090 3854 
Morocco 182 273 299 266 263 463 589 466 534 610 846 1153 1786 2875 3196 
Tunisia 362 396 433 385 346 365 354 346 368 505 558 1613 2290 1791 1760 
 Total (thousands) 89.6 91.2 80.3 73.4 82.8 105.1 113.7 89.0 88.5 83.4 108.5 131.8 154.6 223.9 392.5 
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Type 
Country/subregion of 
origin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
R
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
i
n
 
r
e
f
u
g
e
e
-
l
i
k
e
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
)
 
A
r
a
b
 
L
D
C
s
 
Comoros 28 26 43 58 50 61 72 96 378 268 368 422 454 513 565 
Djibouti 1910 452 471 522 495 504 485 648 650 622 566 602 640 762 860 
Mauritania 29752 29862 30137 30525 31112 31651 33428 33108 45601 39143 37733 39929 33765 34252 34079 
Somalia 475655 440134 432316 402336 389300 395553 464037 457356 561155 678309 770154 1077048 1136719 
112177
0 1106019 
Sudan 494363 489950 508877 606242 730641 693632 686311 523032 419248 368195 387288 500014 568943 648942 665908 
Yemen 2113 1985 1600 1597 1606 1325 1362 1632 1777 1934 2076 2323 2594 2428 2580 
G
C
C
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
Bahrain 95 46 50 52 52 41 62 73 80 79 87 215 297 275 334 
Kuwait 692 701 709 616 398 381 617 746 854 938 988 1120 1197 977 982 
Oman 5 5 19 11 18 12 38 43 56 64 63 60 65 26 20 
Qatar 1  8 13 10 11 52 62 71 68 112 95 124 17 18 
Saudi Arabia 77 35 109 236 214 151 617 753 712 633 667 745 818 584 601 
United Arab Emirates 15 18 31 20 71 30 265 308 256 414 424 486 584 90 84 
M
a
s
h
r
e
q
 
Egypt 3953 4678 6443 5735 5371 6291 7613 6799 6780 6990 6913 7936 10020 12810 15824 
Iraq 526179 530511 422512 368580 311890 262299 1450905 2309245 1903519 1785212 1683579 1428308 746206 401466 369850 
Jordan 919 775 1287 1162 1170 1789 1603 1787 1890 2129 2254 2250 2368 1632 1679 
Lebanon 10215 8763 26320 24932 19865 18323 12252 13094 12967 16260 15869 15013 15106 3819 4246 
State of Palestine 110640 349161 428782 350568 349831 349673 334142 341237 340016 95201 93323 94150 94918 96044 97190 
Syrian Arab Republic 11742 9738 37826 41638 42868 32802 24676 27380 30422 35828 36904 39862 1458044 
493666
4 7767108 
M
a
g
h
r
e
b
 
Algeria 8034 8418 12107 11667 10673 12041 8353 10615 9060 8185 6689 6121 5677 3660 3478 
Libya 619 888 1456 1570 1713 1575 1573 1954 2084 2202 2309 4384 5251 3314 4158 
Morocco 392 363 1269 1291 1318 2920 4710 4039 3533 2286 2284 2312 2407 1308 1501 
Tunisia 1207 1368 2543 2563 2516 3129 2844 2507 2349 2260 2174 1952 1935 1363 1452 
Total (thousands) 1678.6 1877.9 1914.9 1851.9 1901.2 1814.2 3036.0 3736.5 3343.5 3047.2 3052.8 3225.3 4088.1 7272.7 
10078.5 
Grand Total (thousands) 1768.2 1969.1 1995.2 1925.3 1984.0 1919.3 3149.7 3825.6 3432.0 3130.6 3161.4 3357.2 4242.7 7496.6 10471.1 
Source: United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Population Statistics database. Available from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga= 
1.243335942.2081107624.1459256283. Accessed 30 September 2015. 
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Table 14A. Age distribution in 1980, 2015, and 2050 (medium fertility variant, percentage) 
Country/subregion 
1980    2015    2050    
0-14 15-64 65+ 80+ 0-14 15-64 65+ 80+ 0-14 15-64 65+ 80+ 
Comoros 45.4 51.5 3.1 0.3 40.3 56.9 2.8 0.3 30.1 64.0 5.9 0.7 
Djibouti 46.5 51.2 2.4 0.2 32.7 63.1 4.2 0.5 22.2 67.8 10.1 1.5 
Mauritania 45.3 51.8 2.9 0.2 40.0 56.8 3.2 0.4 31.1 63.0 5.9 0.7 
Somalia 43.7 53.0 3.3 0.3 46.7 50.5 2.8 0.3 38.0 58.7 3.3 0.4 
Sudan 47.0 50.1 2.9 0.3 40.5 56.2 3.3 0.4 30.1 63.8 6.1 0.9 
Yemen 49.4 47.8 2.8 0.3 40.3 56.9 2.8 0.3 25.2 68.8 6.0 0.6 
Total Arab LDCs 46.9 50.2 3.0 0.3 41.1 55.8 3.1 0.4 30.0 64.4 5.6 0.7 
Bahrain 34.6 63.4 2.1 0.2 21.5 76.1 2.4 0.3 13.5 69.3 17.2 3.3 
Kuwait 40.5 57.9 1.6 0.2 22.3 75.7 2.0 0.2 17.2 69.0 13.8 1.9 
Oman 45.1 52.2 2.7 0.2 20.5 76.9 2.6 0.4 16.0 66.1 17.9 3.5 
Qatar 33.7 64.7 1.5 0.2 15.5 83.3 1.2 0.1 12.2 74.0 13.8 3.1 
Saudi Arabia 44.5 52.5 3.0 0.3 28.6 68.6 2.9 0.5 18.7 66.0 15.3 2.7 
United Arab Emirates 28.0 70.6 1.5 0.1 13.9 84.9 1.1 0.1 11.7 72.0 16.3 4.1 
Total GCC countries 42.6 54.8 2.7 0.3 24.1 73.5 2.4 0.4 16.8 67.6 15.5 3.0 
Egypt 40.0 55.4 4.6 0.6 33.2 61.6 5.2 0.8 25.7 63.9 10.4 1.8 
Iraq 46.8 49.1 4.1 0.4 41.0 56.0 3.1 0.5 33.0 61.1 5.9 0.8 
Jordan 49.0 47.8 3.2 0.5 35.5 60.7 3.8 0.5 23.7 64.9 11.4 2.0 
Lebanon 39.0 55.6 5.4 0.7 24.0 67.9 8.1 1.5 14.3 62.4 23.3 7.5 
State of Palestine 49.9 47.9 2.3 0.3 40.2 56.8 3.0 0.4 28.8 64.3 6.9 1.2 
Syrian Arab Republic 48.7 48.3 2.9 0.4 37.1 58.8 4.1 0.7 21.8 66.7 11.5 2.0 
Total Mashreq 42.8 52.9 4.2 0.5 35.3 60.1 4.6 0.7 27.1 63.5 9.4 1.6 
Algeria 46.3 50.3 3.4 0.4 28.5 65.5 5.9 1.2 19.8 63.2 16.9 3.9 
Libya 47.8 49.4 2.8 0.3 29.8 65.6 4.5 0.7 18.7 65.2 16.1 2.8 
Morocco 43.4 53.4 3.3 0.4 27.2 66.6 6.2 1.1 18.8 63.9 17.3 4.1 
Tunisia 41.7 54.4 3.9 0.4 23.4 69.1 7.6 1.6 17.4 63.0 19.6 4.8 
Total Maghreb 44.6 52.0 3.4 0.4 27.5 66.4 6.1 1.2 19.1 63.6 17.3 4.0 
Total Arab region 44.1 52.3 3.6 0.4 33.2 62.4 4.3 0.7 25.2 64.2 10.6 2.0 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015, DVD Edition). 
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Table 15A. Selected socioeconomic indicators in Arab countries 
  
Labour force 
participation 
rate, women 
(ages 15-64) 
2013 
(%) 
Labour force 
participation 
rate, men 
(ages 15-64) 
2013 
(%) 
Share of 
women of 
total 
labour 
force  
2013 
(%) 
share of 
women (ages 
20-24) with 
at most 
primary 
education 
2015 
(%) 
share of 
women (ages 
20-24) with 
at least 
upper 
secondary 
education  
2015 
(%) 
share of 
women (ages 
40-44 with at 
least upper 
secondary 
education  
2015 
(%) 
share of 
men (ages 
20-24) with 
at most 
primary 
education 
2015 
(%) 
share of men 
(ages 20-24) 
with at least 
upper 
secondary 
education  
2015 
(%) 
share of men 
(ages 40-44) 
with at least 
upper 
secondary 
education 
2015 
(%) 
Infant 
mort-ality 
rate 
(IMR) 
2015 
GDP 
growth 
(annual) 
2013 
(%) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current 
US$)  
2013 
Algeria 16.2 76.2 17.3 15 54 28 11 44 35 21.9 2.8 5,504.2 
Bahrain 40.7 88.4 19.5 8 77 55 14 57 46 5.3 5.3 24,378.9 
Comoros 35.9 80.5 30.5 57 4 6 51 6 15 55.1 3.5 823.0 
Djibouti 38.5 70.5 34.9 50 13 7 45 15 14 54.2 5.0 1,684.5 
Egypt 25.8 79.1 24.1 19 73 38 15 76 55 20.3 2.1 3,104.2 
Iraq 15.6 72.2 17.6 43 30 26 41 33 41 26.5 8.4 6,882.4 
Jordan 16.4 69.6 18.2 11 70 55 16 60 54 15.4 2.8 5,200.3 
Kuwait 45.1 84.9 27.1 7 58 40 9 45 34 7.3 1.5 48,926.5 
Lebanon 25.9 76.1 24.1 11 68 34 18 58 36 7.1 0.9 9,870.5 
Libya 31.8 79.6 28.1 31 50 25 26 50 37 11.4 -13.6 10,454.8 
Mauritania 29.4 80.2 26.6 56 24 14 43 32 27 65.1 5.7 1,306.0 
Morocco 27.1 78.9 27.0 47 22 12 39 22 20 23.7 4.4 3,056.1 
Oman 30.5 84.5 14.1 29 52 34 25 52 43 9.9 3.9 20,011.3 
Qatar 51.8 95.9 13.1 11 54 59 29 31 38 6.8 6.2 96,719.3 
Saudi Arabia 21.3 79.9 15.2 11 70 33 11 64 49 12.5 2.7 24,646.0 
Somalia 38.8 77.5 33.7 79 10 8 65 26 30 85 .. .. 
State of Palestine .. .. .. 19 42 27 18 53 41 .. .. .. 
Sudan 32.6 76.4 29.4 65 22 11 59 24 18 47.6 3.3 1,726.1 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 14.3 76.0 15.4 32 26 19 32 24 26 11.1 .. .. 
Tunisia 27.3 75.5 26.9 9 50 14 5 42 26 12.1 2.5 4,316.8 
United Arab 
Emirates 46.8 92.3 13.0 10 71 62 12 49 43 5.9 5.2 44,506.8 
Yemen 26.4 74.3 25.9 29 52 34 25 52 43 33.8 4.2 1,408.1 
Sources and notes: Data on the labour force are ILO estimates education data are taken from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (WIC), Wittgenstein Centre Data 
Explorer, version 1.2 2015, available from http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/dataexplorer/ (accessed February 2015). Education data for Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Oman and Yemen are estimated based on 
regional averages for lack of country data (they should thus be interpreted with care). All other data are taken from the World Bank database, available from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ (accessed 
February 2015). 
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